











Changing Farm Structure and the 
Distribution of Farm Payments 
and Federal Crop Insurance
T. Kirk White and Robert A. Hoppewww.ers.usda.gov 
Visit Our Website To Learn More!
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) prohibits discrimination in all its 
programs and activities on the basis of race, color, national origin, age, 
disability, and, where applicable, sex, marital status, familial status, parental 
status, religion, sexual orientation, genetic information, political beliefs, reprisal, 
or because all or a part of an individual’s income is derived from any public 
assistance program. (Not all prohibited bases apply to all programs.) Persons 
with disabilities who require alternative means for communication of program 
information (Braille, large print, audiotape, etc.) should contact USDA’s 
TARGET Center at (202) 720-2600 (voice and TDD). 
To file a complaint of discrimination write to USDA, Director, Office of Civil 
Rights, 1400 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20250-9410 or 
call (800) 795-3272 (voice) or (202) 720-6382 (TDD). USDA is an equal 
opportunity provider and employer.
Cover photo credit: Shutterstock 
    
http://www.ers.usda.gov/
Find additional information : 
Use of commercial and trade names does not imply approval or 
constitute endorsement by USDA.
Recommended citation format for this publication:
T. Kirk White and Robert A. Hoppe. Changing Farm Structure and the 
Distribution of Farm Payments and Federal Crop Insurance, EIB-91, U.S. 




A Report from the Economic Research Service
Abstract
The distribution of commodity-related payments and Federal crop insurance indemnities 
to U.S. farmers has shifted to larger farms as more and more U.S. agricultural production 
is done on those farms. Since the operators of larger farms tend to have higher household 
incomes than other farm operators, commodity-related program payments and Federal 
crop insurance indemnities also have shifted to higher income households. By 2009, half 
of commodity-related program payments went to farms operated by households earning 
over $89,540, a quarter went to farms operated by households with incomes greater than 
$209,000 and 10 percent went to farms operated by households with incomes of at least 
$425,000. Current income eligibility caps and payment limits affect few farm house-
holds because most of them have incomes below the income caps or receive payments 
less than the payment limits. Based on 2009 Agricultural Resource Management Survey 
(ARMS) data, recent proposals to lower those income caps and payment limits would 
still affect only a small percentage of U.S. farm households, because their incomes would 
still fall below the proposed income caps and payment limits. Total Government program 
payments to U.S. farms were $12.3 billion in 2009. Total Federal crop insurance indem-
nity payments were $5.2 billion in 2009.
Keywords: farm program payments, Federal crop insurance, Agricultural Resource 
Management Survey, structural change, income caps, payment limits.
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Summary
What is the Issue?
The Federal Government supports farmers through USDA programs such as 
commodity-related program payments made directly to farmers and indem-
nity payments from Federal crop insurance. In the next farm bill, Congress 
may adjust both the portion of the overall Federal budget going to farm 
programs and the design of these programs. Even if there are no changes in 
farm policy, ongoing changes in farm structure are altering the distribution of 
farm support. We analyze the impact of program design, farm organization, 
and changes in farm structure on the distribution of farm support as policy-
makers contemplate future farm-related legislation. 
What Are the Study Findings?
Total Federal Government program payments to U.S. farms, which summed 
to about $12.3 billion in 2009, have ranged from as high as $24.4 billion in 
2005 to as low as $7.3 billion in the late 1990s. Indemnity payments from 
Federal crop insurance have grown larger in recent years. In 1991, total 
Federal crop insurance indemnity payments to farms were $955 million. 
By 2009, that figure had increased to $5.2 billion. Not all of the increase in 
Federal crop insurance indemnity payments represents net benefits to farms, 
because farms also pay premiums. Similarly, not all Government program 
payments directly benefit farms, because higher payments can lead to higher 
production costs, especially for land rentals. Higher payments attached to 
cropland can lead landowners and farmers to bid up the price of land and 
rental rates for land. Thus, some of the benefits of Government program 
payments flow to nonoperator landlords in the form of higher land rents. A 
significant percentage of U.S. agricultural landlords are not farmers.
A long-term shift in production to larger farms has contributed to a shift in 
the distribution of commodity-related Government program payments and 
Federal crop insurance indemnity payments toward larger farms, most of 
which are family farms. Since operators of larger farms tend to earn higher 
household incomes, this shift has in turn led to a shift in the distribution of 
commodity-related Government payments toward higher income farm house-
holds. Most commodity-related program payments now go to farms oper-
ated by households with annual incomes over $89,000—significantly higher 
incomes than the typical U.S. household. Federal crop insurance indemnity 
payments have also shifted toward farms operated by higher income house-
holds, although not as much as commodity-related program payments.
Congress has created upper limits on the amount of Government program 
payments that can be made to an individual, as well as income caps that 
restrict eligibility to households with income below specified levels. The 
levels differ, depending on program type and income type (farm or off-farm). 
The current payment limits and income eligibility caps affect few recipients 
and only a small share of total payments. Several of the recent proposals 
to lower payment limits or income eligibility caps would still only affect a 
few recipients. However, some types of farms—especially rice and cotton 
farms—could be affected more than others, because they tend to receive iv 
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larger payments than others. Nonetheless, given the small number of farms 
potentially affected by the proposed limits, in most areas these effects would 
be small. Payment limits do not apply to Federal crop insurance indemnities 
or premium subsidies. 
How Was the Study Conducted?
We used data from four main sources: USDA’s Farm Sector Accounts, 
the annual Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS), the U.S. 
Censuses of Agriculture, and summaries of business reports from USDA’s 
Risk Management Agency (RMA). We used the Farm Sector Accounts data 
to estimate total annual Government payments to farms from 1999 to 2009. 
The ARMS data were used to examine receipt of Government payments 
and indemnities from Federal crop insurance by different types of farms, 
the shift of production to larger farms, and changes in the distribution of 
insurance indemnities and Government payments by the level of operator 
household income. Note that some of the programs enacted by the 2008 
Farm Act, such as the Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) program 
and the Supplemental Revenue Assistance Payments (SURE) program, are 
not reflected in the 2009 ARMS data. We used the Census of Agriculture 
for comprehensive data on multi-year changes in acreage and production by 
crop. Those data are not available in either the ARMS or administrative data. 
Finally, we use summaries of business reports from the RMA’s Federal Crop 
Insurance Corporation to calculate totals for Federal crop insurance indemni-
ties received by farmers.1 
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Introduction 
The Federal Government provides support to farmers in a variety of ways, but 
most visibly through USDA programs. USDA agencies perform and support 
research and extension, develop new products, purchase commodities for distri-
bution to school lunch and other feeding programs, and provide services to 
farmers. This report focuses on Federal crop insurance indemnity payments and 
Government farm program payments made directly to farmers. Government 
program payments (hereafter referred to as Government farm payments) to the 
farm sector include commodity program payments, emergency and disaster 
relief payments, conservation program payments, and special programs such 
as the peanut quota buyout. The 2008 Farm Act also introduced a new form of 
Government payment through the Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) 
program, which protects farmers against revenue risk. 
Total Government payments to U.S. farms were about $12.3 billion in 2009. 
They also vary considerably from year to year, depending on market condi-
tions, the occurrence of natural disasters, and changes in program design. In 
recent years, total Government payments have ranged from as low as $7.3 
billion in 1995 and 1996 to as high as $24.4 billion in 2005. 
In addition to Government payments, USDA supports farmers through crop 
insurance programs. USDA’s Risk Management Agency (RMA) reduces 
risk for farmers by subsidizing commercially provided insurance premiums. 
Indemnity payments from Federal crop insurance (hereafter referred to as 
indemnity payments) have grown larger in recent years. In 1991, total Federal 
indemnity payments to farms were $955 million. By 2009, that figure had 
increased to $5.2 billion. 
Regardless of the level of payments, however, a long-term shift in production 
to larger farms has contributed to a shift in the distribution of commodity-
related Government payments and Federal indemnity payments toward larger 
farms. Since operators of larger farms tend to earn higher incomes, this shift 
has, in turn, led to a shift in the distribution of commodity-related Government 
payments toward higher income farm households. Federal indemnity payments 
have also shifted toward higher income households, although not as much as 
commodity-related Government payments.
Congress has created upper limits on the amount of Government payments that 
can be made to an individual as well as income eligibility limits that restrict 
eligibility for payments to households with income below specified levels. 
However, the current payment caps and income eligibility limits affect few 
recipients and only a small share of total payments. 
In this report, we look at both the level and the distribution of payments to 
farmers and how these payments have changed over time. We examine the 
distribution of payments across commodity specializations, farm sizes, and 
farm household income classes, and how structural change in agriculture has 
shifted payments to larger farms and higher income farm households. We also 
consider the impacts of payments on land values and land rents, and hence, on 
landlords. Finally, we evaluate the impact of current and proposed payment 
limits and eligibility restrictions on the distribution of payments.2 
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Sources of Data
We use data from four main sources: USDA’s Farm Sector Accounts, 
the annual Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS), the U.S. 
Censuses of Agriculture, and administrative data from RMA’s Federal Crop 
Insurance Business Summary Reports. The Farm Sector Accounts provide 
data on Government payments back to 1933, with a detailed breakdown of 
payments by source between 1996 and 2009. The sector accounts are based 
on administrative data and provide more or less complete estimates of all 
types of Government payments. 
Although the administrative data provide nearly complete coverage of 
payments, they do not link payments to farm-level data on production and 
farm operator households. The ARMS provides such a link. The ARMS is 
jointly designed and administered each year by USDA’s National Agricultural 
Statistics Service (NASS) and Economic Research Service (ERS). Beginning 
in 1996, ARMS covers U.S. farming operations and their operators in the 
48 contiguous States. For earlier years, comparable data are available from 
ARMS’ predecessor, the Farm Costs and Returns Survey (FCRS).
We use the Census of Agriculture for comprehensive data on multi-year 
changes in acreage and production by crop. Those data are not available in 
either the ARMS data or the administrative data. Finally, we use RMA’s 
Federal Crop Insurance Business Summary Reports for comprehensive data 
on Federal crop insurance indemnity payments. Although both the farm 
sector accounts (based on administrative data) and the ARMS include data 
on Government payments, there are some disparities between these two 
datasets that can lead to different estimates, based on the data source. The 
box “ARMS versus Administrative Data” discusses these differences and the 
advantages of each data source. 
Time Period for Agricultural Resource Management 
Survey and Farm Costs and Returns Survey 
When following trends using ARMS and FCRS data, we start with 1991, the 
first year that the FCRS and ARMS are fully compatible. The report focuses 
on selected years—1991, 1997, 2003, and 2009—for ease in presentation. 
This gives four snapshots of agriculture, each 6 years apart. 
Because prices changed between 1991 and 2009, we adjust dollar amounts 
for price changes. No single price index is appropriate in all cases. Three 
are used in this report (see box “Adjusting for Price Changes” for more 
information). 
Farm Classification
In this report we classify farms as family farms or nonfamily farms. Family 
farms are those in which the principal operator and people related to the prin-
cipal operator by blood, marriage, or adoption own more than 50 percent of 
the farm business, whether as a sole proprietorship, a partnership, or a family-
controlled corporation. We further classify family farms as noncommercial 
farms (annual sales less than $10,000), small commercial farms (annual sales 3 
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ARMS versus Administrative Data
We use two sources of data on Government payments and Federal indemnity payments—ARMS and administra-
tive data from the USDA program agencies responsible for the payments. The USDA Farm Service Agency (FSA) 
administers the commodity-related programs that provide payments directly to farmers. Conservation programs 
are administered by USDA’s FSA and Natural Resources Conservation Service. Federally subsidized crop insur-
ance programs are administered by USDA’s Risk Management Agency, with indemnity payments coming from 
the Federal Crop Insurance Summary of Business Reports.
The two types of data have different strengths and weaknesses. Administrative data are both comprehensive and 
report actual Federal Government payouts; the ARMS data are based on information provided by respondents to 
a sample survey, so are not comprehensive and are only as accurate as the respondents’ records or recollection. 
While the ARMS survey was designed to be representative of U.S. farms, it is not necessarily a representative 
sample of farms that participate in Government payment or insurance programs. But it has one big advantage over 
administrative data—ARMS data allow us to examine relationships that cannot be studied with administrative 
data alone, such as the distribution of payments by farm size and household income.
There are other important differences that need to 
be kept in mind when comparing results based on 
ARMS and administrative data. ARMS collects 
information on the farm business and the prin-
cipal farm operator’s household while adminis-
trative data typically report data for individual 
beneficiaries or other administrative units, such 
as insurance policies. Administrative data is 
often reported on a fiscal-year basis while ARMS 
data are for calendar years. As a result, estimates 
of total program outlays will differ, and we rely 
on administrative data adjusted to cover the 
calendar year whenever we report such informa-
tion. Estimates of the average size of payments 
can also differ widely since the units of observation in ARMS and administrative data are different. Since we are 
interested in payments to farms and farm households, we use ARMS data for all estimates of average payment size 
and the distribution of payments in this report.
While ARMS’ coverage of Government program payments and crop insurance indemnities varies by program and over 
time, in general the survey appears to capture a fairly high percentage of payments. This study uses the ARMS Phase 
III surveys for information on the types of farms that receive Government payments and insurance indemnities. For 
2006 to 2009, Park et al. (2010) find that ARMS estimates of total Government payments are on average about $3.3 
billion lower than, or about 75 percent of, the corresponding estimates from calendar-year administrative data. Unlike 
administrative data, however, the ARMS data exclude farm program payments to nonoperator landlords. This accounts 
for about $2.3 billion per year (2006-2009). If we restrict attention to the share of payments received by farm operators, 
the ARMS captures about 90 percent of the payments in the sector accounts over this period.1 
The ARMS coverage of Federal indemnity payments is not as complete as it is for Government program payments, 
but it has improved from about 62 percent of total Federal indemnity payments in 1997 to about 81 percent in 2009 
(see table). Thus, we are confident that the relationships discussed in this report are accurate.
1See pages 15-16 in Park et al. (2010) for a detailed comparison of Government payments in the ARMS versus the farm sector accounts 
(derived from administrative data).
Total Federal indemnity payments and farms receiving them
1997, 2003, and 2009 ARMS
Crop year
Farms receiving  
Federal indemnities
(number of farms)





1997 76,715 1.2 0.62
2003 140,618 3.9 0.61
2009 134,757 5.2 0.81
GDP = Gross domestic product.
RMA = Risk Management Agency, USDA.
Note: indemnities are in 2009 dollars, deflated using the GDP chain-type price index
Source: USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service and Economic Research  
Service, 1997, 2003, and 2009 Agricultural Resource Management Survey. 4 
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Adjusting for Price Changes




Sales class, Government payments, and household income are all commonly measured in current dollars. Since we are focusing on 
changes in production—not changes in dollars—we adjust these dollar amounts for any price changes that may have occurred in the 
1991-2009 period. This ensures that the reported changes reflect changes in production rather than prices. 
To see the need for adjusting for price changes, consider a simple example. In 1991, the average corn yield in Iowa was 117 bushels 
per acre, and the season-average price was $2.30 per bushel. In 2009, the corresponding figures were 182 bushels per acre and $3.59 
per bushel. Thus in 1991 the average corn acre in Iowa generated $269 of revenue (the product of 117 and $2.30), while in 2009 
the average acre generated $653. Part of the increase in revenue per acre reflected greater corn production, but part reflected price 
increases (from $2.30 to $3.59). Using revenue as a 
measure of production would overstate the increase 
in corn production. 
When we measure more aggregated quantities 
such sales of all farms products, the issue of price 
changes is a little more complex than in the Iowa 
corn example, because there may be many different 
products and therefore many different prices. In 
this case, we use a price index, which is a weighted 
average of prices for a given set of goods or services 
in a given time period. Different sets of goods and 
services require different price indices. We use three 
in this report:
•	Producer price index (PPI) for farm prod-
ucts. To adjust farm sales for price changes, 
we use an index that captures commodity 
prices received by farmers. The farm PPI is 
used to express sales in constant dollars to 
ensure that a shift in farms to higher sales 
classes between two years reflects greater 
physical production, rather than an increase in 
commodity prices. Deflating farm sales by the PPI for farm products adjusts for farm price changes, and allows us to 
compare quantities of production over time. 
•	Gross domestic product (GDP) chain-type price index. In the case of Government payments, we need a broader 
price index than the farm PPI. Government payments are funded by taxes—or borrowing—from other economic enti-
ties, so the relevant price index should reflect the general price level for the entire economy. We use the GDP chain-
type price index. This allows us to compare government payments over time as if we were comparing how much of the 
output of the entire economy they would buy in different years. 
•	Consumer price index for all urban consumers (CPI-U). When we look at changes in household income over time, 
we want to measure changes in purchasing power, i.e., changes in the household’s ability to purchase a standard basket 
of goods. To do this, we deflate household income by the CPI-U. The CPI-U prices a market basket of goods and 
services that consumers typically buy and follows the change in the cost of the basket over time. Ideally, a CPI for rural 
areas or for farm households would be used in this report, but such an index does not exist.
Both the GDP chain-type index and the CPI-U increased steadily between 1991 and 2009 (see the figure). An exception was 2009 
when the CPI-U declined slightly, a result of the recession ending in June 2009. Changes in the PPI for farm products were less consis-
tent than those for the other indices, reflecting the volatility of farm commodity prices. Nevertheless, the farm PPI prior to 2006 fell 
within a relatively narrow range, from 93 to 117. Commodity price change became more marked when the index jumped from 111 
in 2006 to 153 in 2008 and then back fell to 123 in 2009. Obviously, using the appropriate time series index is important, because the 
three indexes are substantially different in most years. 
Value of three price indices, 1991-2009
The farm PPI shows no clear trend, unlike the two other indices 
Index value (1991 = 100)
GDP = Gross domestic product.
Source:  U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics for the CPI-U and 
PPI for farm products; U.S. Department of  Commerce, Bureau of Economic 
Analysis for the GDP chain-type price index.
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between $10,000 and $249,999), large farms (annual sales between $250,000 
to $999,999), and very large farms (annual sales of $1 million or more). 
Nonfamily farms include any farm for which the operator and relatives do not 
own a majority of the business. For example, nonfamily farms include farms 
operated by publicly held corporations, farms equally owned by three unrelated 
business partners, as well as farms operated by a hired manager for a family of 
absentee owners.
Government Payments Programs for Farmers  
and Federal Crop Insurance 
USDA runs several different types of payment programs for farmers. We 
classify these payment programs as follows:  
•	Commodity direct or “fixed” payments to farmers are based on their 
historic production of program crops. These include production flexibility 
contract (PFC) payments prior to the 2002 Farm Act. Direct payments are 
paid annually based on a producer’s historical acreage (so-called “base 
acreage”) and yields of program crops in earlier years.
•	Counter-cyclical payments (CCP) provide benefits to producers with 
historical production of certain crops. Unlike direct payments, the 
counter-cyclical payment rate depends on market prices.
•	The Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) program, authorized by 
the 2008 Farm Act, is an alternative to the counter-cyclical payments 
program for crop years 2009 to 2012. Under the ACRE program, 
payments are triggered when State revenue and farm-level revenue for a 
commodity fall below benchmark levels. ACRE program payments were 
first reported by farmers in 2010.
•	Marketing loan benefits include loan deficiency payments (LDP), 
marketing loan gains, and, through the 2009 crop, commodity certificate 
gains. Unlike direct payments and counter-cyclical payments, marketing 
loan benefits directly depend on current production. Marketing loan bene-
fits are only paid when market prices are low.
•	Conservation payments include land-retirement programs and working-land 
programs. Land-retirement programs require that landowners not produce on 
land enrolled in the program. Working-land programs provide incentives for 
natural resource conservation on land still in production.
•	Emergency or disaster relief payments were generally ad hoc Government 
responses to droughts, floods, or other natural disasters prior to the 2008 
Farm Act. In 2008, the Supplemental Agricultural Disaster Assistance 
Program was created to replace these ad hoc disaster programs.
•	All	other	Government	payments	to	farms.	
In addition to Government payments, USDA reduces risk for farmers by subsi-
dizing crop insurance. Costs to the Federal Government from the crop insurance 
program fall under three major categories: Federal premium subsidies, adminis-
trative and operating (A&O) costs, and program underwriting losses (or gains). 6 
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Over the period covered by this report—1991 to 2009—farm programs have 
undergone a number of changes. While we attempt to describe the programs 
as they currently exist (see Appendix for additional program design informa-
tion), it is important to recognize that not all of the 2008 Farm Act’s provisions 
resulted in payments in 2009. Thus, while ACRE and the Supplemental Revenue 
Assistance Payments Programs were enacted in 2008, they are not reflected in 
the 2009 Government payments reported by ARMS respondents. On the other 
hand, some 2008 Farm Act provisions are reflected in the 2009 payments. For 
example, starting in 2009, most farms with fewer than 10 base acres (a measure 
used to calculate the size of direct and counter-cyclical program payments) were 
no longer eligible for such payments (Arriola et al., 2011). 7 
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Who Receives the Benefits of Government  
Payments?
The billions of dollars the Government spends on payments to farmers 
undoubtedly benefit farmers. However, one dollar of Government payments 
does not necessarily translate into a dollar of net benefit to farmers. Payments 
can affect farmers’ expenses as well as revenues. Payments affect land rents, 
and most cropland is rented. Furthermore, different programs benefit farmers 
in different ways. Finally, the level of support also varies with a farm’s mix 
of commodities. For example, farms that historically grew program crops are 
often eligible for direct payments, but farms that grow only fruits and vegeta-
bles are not eligible for direct payments.
The Land Market 
To understand how payments affect land rents, we first need to understand 
the market for cropland since many Government payments are based on 
current or historic crop production. Crop farmers may own their land, they 
may rent some or all of it for cash, and they may rent some or all of it for a 
share of production (share-rent). Cash rents are determined at the beginning 
of the season. So under a cash lease agreement, the landlord does not assume 
any of the risk associated with uncertain harvests. Share-lease agreements 
are also set at the beginning of the season, but the payment to the landlord 
is determined after the uncertainty about production and prices is resolved. 
Thus, under a share lease, the landlord assumes some of the risk. Under share 
leases, landlords are also eligible for a share of Government payments. 
Payments increase the gross returns to land. The gross return to land includes 
both the returns the producer can make from producing and selling crops 
or livestock and the Government payments the producer can receive. Like 
any other asset, an increase in the gross returns to land drives up the price of 
that land. For example, suppose a landowner rents a plot of land to a farm 
operator. When Government payments increase, the landowner may realize 
that the operator can earn more from the land, and as a result, the landlord 
may charge higher rent. Alternatively, when Government payments increase, 
other farm operators, realizing they can earner higher gross returns, may 
offer higher rent for the plot of land, thus bidding up the rental rate. 
Figure 1 is a simplified diagram of the flow of Government payments through 
the farm sector. In 2009, about $12.4 billion flowed to the farm sector. Of 
this total, $10 billion went directly to family farm businesses, $0.6 billion 
went to nonfamily farm businesses, and $1.8 billion went to nonoperator 
landlords. Of the $10 billion received by family farm businesses, some went 
to pay for increased cash rents to other family farm businesses, other nonfa-
mily farm businesses, or nonoperator landlords, or to pay other expenses 
associated with production. The rest went to operator households, partners’ 
households, recipients of dividends from family corporations, or other house-
holds associated with the farm. The flow of payments from nonfamily farms 
to households follows a similar path.
Recent research supports the hypothesis that some of the benefits of 
payments are mitigated by higher costs to farmers in the form of higher 8 
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land prices and higher rental payments for land. Using data from the 1992 
and 1997 Censuses of Agriculture, Roberts, Kirwan, and Hopkins (2003) 
found that between 34 and 41 cents of each Government-payment dollar 
went to increased land rents. In more recent research using the same data, 
Kirwan (2009) found that landlords capture roughly 25 percent of each 
additional dollar of Government payments to farmers in the form of higher 
cash rents. Although many farmers own their own land, 64 percent of crop-
land is operated by someone other than the owner.1 Goodwin, Mishra, and 
Ortalo-Magné (2011) report that 57 percent of agricultural landlords are not 
farmers. Kirwan (2009) finds that 94 percent of rented farmland is owned by 
nonfarmers. Thus nonfarmer landlords are likely to capture a significant frac-
tion of the benefits of Government payments to farmers. 
Economic theory suggests that Government payments might also raise the 
costs of other agricultural inputs that are in short supply to the extent that 
payments increase demand for inputs to production. Therefore, some portion 
of Government payments may also flow to inputs providers. To summa-
rize, empirical evidence and economic theory suggest that for most farmers, 
Government payments raise both revenues and expenses.
An additional dollar of payments can provide different benefits to producers of 
the same crop depending on whether they own, cash-rent, or share-rent. These 
benefits also depend on the type of program. For example, using ARMS data 
from 1998 to 2001, Goodwin, Mishra, and Ortalo-Magné (2011) found that 
an additional dollar (per year) of expected loan deficiency payments appeared 
to add $27 to the value of the land. This benefits eligible cropland owners 
(both farmer and nonfarmer) but not tenants. These researchers also found 
  1The data source for this statistic 
is the 1999 Agricultural Economics 
and Land Ownership Survey, the most 
recent comprehensive data available on 
rented cropland.
Figure 1
The flow of Government payments through the farm sector, 2009
Household level
(households of stakeholders)
*From 2009 farm sector accounts.
**Sector estimate was distributed by ratios computed from ARMS.
Business level
Government payments do not all ultimately flow to operator households, dollar for dollar:
• Payments may be capitalized into the value of land, which raises rents.
• For some programs, receipt of payments requires  production of commodities, which entails expenses. 
  Payments may also be capitalized into prices paid for inputs.
• Some payments go to nonoperator landlords, nonfamily farms, and other stakeholders.
 
Source: USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service and Economic Research Service, 2009 Agricultural Resource Management Survey 
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that an additional dollar per acre of direct payments (or production flexibility 
contract payments, as they were called prior to 2002) raised cash rents by 29 
cents per acre, while an additional dollar of expected LDPs per acre raised cash 
rents by 83 cents per acre. In contrast, neither direct payments nor expected 
LDPs appear to influence share-rental rates, presumably because the landlords 
already receive their share of the payments as part of the share-lease. 
Risk Mitigation
Different Government payment programs also protect farmers against different 
types of risk. Some Government programs—particularly those that vary 
with commodity prices, such as marketing loan programs, counter-cyclical 
payments, and ad hoc market loss assistance payments—reduce revenue risk 
for farmers. Marketing loan benefits accrue to farmers when prices are low. 
Thus they provide insurance against down-side price risk. The ACRE program 
provides some protection against a farmer’s revenue risk. Agricultural disaster 
payments and ad hoc market loss assistance payments also directly insured 
against revenue risk, since these have historically been enacted by Congress 
when revenues for particular crops or areas are low. 
Although counter-cyclical payments are not tied to current production, they 
also provide revenue risk protection, especially if the farmer chooses to 
plant the same crop as the crop upon which the counter-cyclical payments 
are based, since CCPs are larger when prices are lower (Westcott, Young, 
and Price 2002). The insurance effects of Government payments are supple-
mented by crop insurance subsidized by USDA’s RMA. Different crop insur-
ance policies protect against the risk of low yields or low revenues at either 
the farm level or the county level.
Variation by Farm Size and Specialization
Government payments also vary by farm type and sales classes. Tables 1 
and 2 show the distribution of Government payments by farm type and sales 
class in 2005, the most recent year of large total payments, and 2009, the 
most recent year of complete ARMS data at the time this study was initiated. 
The four panels of the tables show the total number of farms, the percent of 
farms reporting payments, the average payment per farm reporting payments, 
and payments as a percentage of gross cash farm income (GCFI) among 
farms reporting payments. GCFI is the sum of the farm’s cash and marketing 
contract revenues from the sale of livestock and crops, Government 
payments, and other farm-related income, including fees from production 
contracts. Examining payments’ share of GCFI gives an idea of how much of 
a farm’s gross income is coming from Government payments. 
Farm types are defined by the type of farm commodity that represents the 
largest portion of the farm’s gross cash farm income in a given year. If more 
than 50 percent of a farm’s gross income comes from the sale of cotton, the 
farm is classified as a cotton farm (“cash grains and cotton”), even though it 
may produce other crops. If no commodity comprises more than 50 percent 
of a farm’s gross income, then the farm is classified as a general crop farm 
(or a general livestock farm if the farm primarily produces livestock). 10 
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Table 1
Distribution of Government payments, 2005 
Payments’ share of gross cash income varies by farm type and size 
  Farm type defined with value of production 
Item
Cash grains  
and cotton General crops High-value crops
Dairy and  
livestock 48-State total
Number of farms Numbers
   All 306,616 449,414 140,168 1,198,679 2,094,876
   Less than $10,000 43,905 330,499 54,117 696,547 1,125,067
   $10,000-$249,999 183,601 95,845 57,740 397,365 734,551
   $250,000-$999,999 61,470 9,229 11,638 56,342 138,678
   $1,000,000 or more 7,374 1,572 6,738 20,067 35,751
   Nonfamily (any size) 10,266 12,269 9,936 28,357 60,828
Farms receiving  
payments Percent of farms 
   All 92.6 56.3 14.2 28.6 42.9
   Less than $10,000 72.2 48.1 *4.8 11.6 24.4
   $10,000-$249,999 95.3 76.1 16.4 50.2 62.2
   $250,000-$999,999 98.9 91.6 33.0 67.8 80.3
   $1,000,000 or more 99.4 87.7 34.5 65.9 67.8
   Nonfamily (any size) 86.7 91.9 16.5 36.5 52.9
Mean payment per  
reporting farm Inflation-adjusted dollars per farm 
   All 34,461 9,409 28,095 10,131 18,004
   Less than $10,000 1,887 3,116 na 1,290 2,421
   $10,000-$249,999 17,900 13,018 14,554 6,498 12,073
   $250,000-$999,999 72,477 60,477 35,628 27,107 54,720
   $1,000,000 or more 205,024 146,129 75,183 60,350 110,383
   Nonfamily (any size) 76,029 19,865 *63,710 *22,622 38,533
Share of gross cash farm 
income, reporting farms
Percent
   All 16.0 18.9 4.9 5.6 11.0
   Less than $10,000 *21.1 45.9 na 20.1 35.0
   $10,000-$249,999 18.1 24.5 14.0 9.7 15.5
   $250,000-$999,999 16.2 13.2 6.9 6.9 12.7
   $1,000,000 or more 12.5 7.4 3.0 2.9 5.6
   Nonfamily (any size) 15.2 21.5 *3.9 *4.0 8.8
All 48 contiguous States were included in the sample.
   Coefficient of variation = (standard error/estimate)*100.
   * = CV is greater than 25 and less than or equal to 50. 
   na = value is not available due to no observations, an undefined statistic, or reliability concerns.
Source: USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service and Economic Research Service, 2005 Agricultural Resource Management Survey, using 
all versions of the survey.11 
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Table 2
Distribution of Government payments, 2009
For most farm types and sizes, payments comprised a smaller share of gross cash income than in 2005 
  Farm type defined with value of production  
Item
Cash grains  
and cotton General crops High-value crops
Dairy and  
livestock 48-State total
Number of farms Numbers
   All 330,394 537,193 146,126 1,178,140 2,191,853
   Less than $10,000 38,849 426,750 53,486 762,703 1,281,788
   $10,000-$249,999 174,559 81,590 65,386 317,735 639,270
   $250,000-$999,999 90,036 9,134 13,606 53,236 166,012
   $1,000,000 or more 13,971 2,538 6,303 21,124 43,937
   Nonfamily (any size) 12,979 17,182 7,343 23,342 60,846
Farms receiving  
payments Percent of farms 
   All 85.5 50.7 10.5 21.2 37.4
   Less than $10,000 45.5 45.9 *4.4 8.7 22.0
   $10,000-$249,999 88.3 68.6 11.9 42.1 55.0
   $250,000-$999,999 96.9 80.8 23.4 58.9 77.8
   $1,000,000 or more 95.3 86.2 25.9 59.1 67.4
   Nonfamily (any size) 77.7 63.7 *5.3 24.6 44.6
Mean payment per  
reporting farm Inflation-adjusted dollars per farm 
   All 15,962 7,316 13,872 10,736 11,459
   Less than $10,000 1,196 2,980 na 1,268 2,458
   $10,000-$249,999 7,235 14,566 *6,384 6,799 8,218
   $250,000-$999,999 25,362 37,557 13,895 30,272 26,968
   $1,000,000 or more 73,386 86,307 *58,659 44,472 61,347
   Nonfamily (any size) 18,164 *11,671 *47,002 31,923 18,868
Share of gross cash farm 
income, reporting farms
Percent
   All 5.1 13.5 2.1 4.6 5.5
   Less than $10,000 12.9 36.7 na *10.9 27.3
   $10,000-$249,999 6.9 24.3 *5.8 8.9 9.5
   $250,000-$999,999 4.9 6.4 2.3 6.7 5.4
   $1,000,000 or more 4.0 4.3 *1.7 2.1 3.0
   Nonfamily (any size) 4.8 11.3 *1.3 2.6 3.9
All 48 contiguous States were included in the sample.
   Coefficient of variation = (standard error/estimate)*100.
   * = CV is greater than 25 and less than or equal to 50. 
   na = value is not available due to no observations, an undefined statistic, or reliability concerns.
Source: USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service and Economic Research Service, 2009 Agricultural Resource Management Survey,  
using all versions of the survey.12 
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In 2005, about 43 percent of the 2.1 million farms in 48 States received 
Government payments. The number and percentage of farms receiving 
Government payments varied considerably across farm types and farm 
sales classes. In 2005, about 93 percent of the approximately 307,000 cash 
grains and cotton farms received payments. Cash grains and cotton include 
most of the major program crops: cotton, corn, soybeans, wheat, barley, 
sorghum, oats, and rice. Lower percentages of other types of farms receive 
payments. In 2005, only 14 percent of the approximately 140,000 high-value 
crops farms2 and 29 percent of the 1.2 million dairy and livestock farms 
received Government payments. In most cases, these farms receive payments 
because they are also producing program crops. For most types of farms, the 
percentage of farms receiving payments increases with sales class. While 
only 72 percent of noncommercial cash grains and cotton farms received 
payments, about 99 percent of cash grains and cotton farms with sales over 
$250,000 received payments. 
Average payments per farm also varied considerably by farm type and sales 
class. For every type of farm, in 2005, the average payment per farm rose 
significantly with farm sales class. Average payments varied the most among 
cash grains and cotton farms, ranging from $1,887 for noncommercial farms 
to about $205,000 for farms with sales of $1 million or more. In table 1, we 
have adjusted prices to 2009 dollars as described in the box “Adjusting for 
Price Changes.” These are average payments for farms receiving payments, 
so farms that did not receive Government payments are excluded from the 
averages. Average payments for other types of farms tended to be smaller 
than those for cash grains or cotton. However, since nonoperator landlords 
capture some of the payments, operators of cash grains and cotton farms do 
not receive all the benefits of these higher payments.
The final panel of table 1 shows payments as a percentage of GCFI in 2005. 
Averaging across all sales classes, payments’ share of GCFI ranged from 
about 5 percent for high-value crop farms to 19 percent for general crop 
farms. The latter category includes all crop farms that are not classified in 
one of the other categories of crop farms. With the exception of high-value 
crops, Government payments accounted for a larger percentage of GCFI for 
crop farms than they did for livestock and dairy farms. However, since some 
of these payments also result in higher production costs for crop farms, the 
operators of these farms do not receive all of the benefits of these payments. 
For most types of crop farms—cash grains and cotton, general crops, and 
high-value crops—payments’ share of GCFI declines with farm sales class. 
For example, payments account for about 21 percent of the GCFI of noncom-
mercial cash grains and cotton farms, but only 13 percent of the GCFI of 
cash grains and cotton farms with sales of $1 million or more.
The size of Government payments also varies across years, depending on 
yields and market prices. Table 2 shows the distribution of payments by farm 
type and sales class in 2009. In years when prices are low—such as 2005—a 
higher percentage of farms receive payments, and payments per farm and 
payments’ share of GCFI are higher. Compared to 2005, a lower percentage 
of farms in all sales classes reported receiving payments in 2009. The biggest 
decrease occurred among noncommercial cash grains and cotton farms, 
only 46 percent of which reported receiving payments in 2009, down from 
72 percent in 2005. In general, program participation in 2009 followed the 
  2High-value crops include fruits, 
vegetables, and nursery and greenhouse 
crops.13 
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same patterns as in 2005: higher percentages of cash grains and cotton farms 
participated than did livestock and dairy farms and high-value crop farms. As 
in 2005, the percentage of farms receiving payments tended to increase with 
sales class in 2009. 
For most farm types and sizes, average payments per farm were lower in 
2009 than in 2005. At this level of aggregation, the average payment per 
farm increased with sales class for all types of farms. For example, cash 
grains and cotton farms with sales between $250,000 and $999,999 received 
about $25,000 of Government payments per farm in 2009, while cash grains 
and cotton farms with sales over $1 million received about $73,000 per farm.
Compared to 2005, payments as a share of GCFI in 2009 were lower for 
all types of farms. Payments’ share of GCFI declined especially sharply for 
cash grains and cotton farms, from 16 percent in 2005 to 5 percent in 2009. 
Payments in 2009 accounted for a larger percentage of GCFI for general crop 
farms than they did for other types of farms. For all types of farms, payments 
as a share of GCFI were lower for larger farms in 2009, just as in 2005. 
In summary, Government payments to farms vary by type of program, farm 
type, farm size, and year. Cash grain and cotton farms had the highest share 
of farms receiving payments. Larger farms of most types are more likely 
to receive payments and tend to receive larger payments, although these 
payments are a smaller percentage of these farms’ gross income. When prices 
are low, payments per farm and payments’ share of GCFI are higher, and a 
larger proportion of farms receive payments. However, a dollar of payments 
does not equal a dollar of net benefit to farms, because Government payments 
may result in greater expenses for farms, as well as greater revenue.14 
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Changes in Government Payments and  
Crop Insurance Programs
Figure 2 shows the annual variation in Government payments from 1999 
to 2009 for commodity direct payments; marketing loan benefits; counter-
cyclical payments; conservation payments; disaster/emergency; and all other 
Government payments to farms. We chose the period 1999 to 2009 in order 
to focus on recent trends. 
Spending in the conservation category tends to be stable, because the 
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), created in the 1985 Farm Act, has 
historically accounted for the bulk of conservation payments. The CRP uses 
long-term contracts and while land has moved into and out of the program 
over time, the level of enrollment has remained fairly steady since the first 
years of the program. Since enrollment in land-retirement programs takes 
land out of production, increases in land-retirement enrollment acreage 
tend to decrease overall commodity-related payments and Federal indemni-
ties. Working-land programs have expanded since 2002, and working-land 
payments are now almost as large as payments under the CRP. 
Emergency or disaster relief payments fluctuate from year to year, since 
they were ad hoc Government responses to disasters such as droughts or 
floods over the period covered in this study. The “other payments” category 
includes programs such as milk income loss payments and temporary 




Government payments by program, 1999 to 2009
Conservation payments and direct payments are relatively stable
 
1Deflated with the gross domestic product (GDP) chain-type price index. 
2Includes peanut quota buyout payments, milk income loss payments, and tobacco transition 
payments.
3Loan deficiency payments, marketing loan gains, and certificate exchange gains.
4Includes the similar production flexibility contract payments that preceded direct payments.
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service, U.S. and State Farm Income Data (the farm sector 
accounts). 
2009 dollars (billions)1
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For ease of exposition, we aggregate the payment programs into two broad 
categories: commodity-related payments and conservation payments. 
Commodity direct or fixed payments, payments depending on market prices, 
disaster and emergency payments, and the “other payments” categories are 
collectively called commodity-related payments.3 We also break the second 
category, conservation payments, into two subcategories: land-retirement 
payments (including the CRP) and working-land payments, (including the 
Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) and the Conservation 
Security Program (CSP), which was replaced by the the Conservation 
Stewardship Program (CStP) in the 2008 Farm Act.
Federal Crop Insurance
Federal crop insurance premium subsidies and indemnity payments have 
increased substantially in the past 20 years (table 3).4 The largest increase 
occurred between 1991 and 1997, when the number of policies, the value of 
premiums and crops, and the amount of land insured all roughly doubled. 
Government subsidies increased from $200 million in 1991 to $5.4 billion in 
2009. The Agricultural Risk Protection Act (ARPA) of 2000 also introduced 
substantial changes to Federal crop insurance programs. ARPA increased the 
portion of the premium that is subsidized (the subsidy rate) for higher levels 
of coverage. This led to an increase in program participation at higher levels 
of coverage (Dismukes and Vandeveer, 2001). Later growth in crop insur-
ance resulted from increased subsidies for more costly insurance policies 
and from the introduction of new insurance products.5 Indemnities typically 
range between $1 billion and $5 billion annually. Indemnities show less of a 
trend than the other statistics, since these payments are more directly related 
to events like droughts and floods that occur sporadically. Most federally 
subsidized indemnity payments are not Government support per se, because 
the producers pay a portion of the insurance premium. 
The 2008 Farm Act requires farms to have crop insurance in order to partici-
pate in a new program, the Supplemental Revenue Assistance Payments 
(SURE) Program (USDA, FSA, 2008). The SURE program was designed 
to replace ad hoc disaster programs that provided aid in response to natural 
  3Commodity-related payments also 
include the Average Crop Revenue 
Election (ACRE) program. ACRE is 
an optional revenue-based program 
introduced by the 2008 Farm Act as an 
alternative to counter-cyclical pay-
ments.
  4Table 3 uses administrative data 
from the USDA’s Risk Management 
Agency. For a comparison of these 
data and ARMS data, see box “ARMS 
versus Administrative Data.”
  5For more information, see “Crop 




Magnitude of Federal crop insurance, 1991, 1997, 2003, and 2009
Crop year
Policies with 
premiums Total premiums Subsidies
Value of crops 
insured
Indemnities 
received by  
farmers Land insured
Number 2009 dollars (billion)1 Million acres
1991 706,822 0.9 0.2 14.3 1.2 82.4
1997 1,319,762 2.1 1.1 30.3 1.2 182.2
2003 1,241,468 4.1 2.5 49.0 3.9 217.4
2009 1,171,901 8.9 5.4 79.6 5.2 264.8
Note: Data accurate as of July 4, 2011.
1The producer price index (PPI) for farm products was used to adjust for price changes in the value of crops insured. The gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) chain-type price index was used to adjust premiums, indemnities, and subsidies.
Source:  USDA, Risk Management Agency, Federal Crop Insurance Corporation, Summary of Business Reports, 1989 through 1997, 1998 
through 2007, and 2008 through 2011, available at: http://www.rma.usda.gov/data/sob.html/.16 
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disasters. To be eligible for SURE, farms must have Federal crop insurance 
for all their crops or be covered by the Noninsured Crop Disaster Assistance 
Program.
Most farms specializing in cash grains, cotton, and peanuts reported farmland 
covered under a Federal crop insurance policy in the 2009 ARMS (fig. 3). 
Farms with other specializations participated in Federal crop insurance, but 
to a lesser degree. About a third of tobacco farms had insured land, as well 
as 20 to 30 percent of farms specializing in hogs, dairy, or fruits, vegetables, 
and tree nuts. Hog and dairy farms often grow crops to feed their livestock, 
and these crops are eligible for Federal crop insurance.
 
Figure 3
Farms reporting  acres covered under a Federal crop insurance policy by specialization, 2009
Most cash grain, cotton, and peanut farms insure their crops
 
Percent of farms
Note:  A farm’s specialization is the commodity that accounts for at least half of its value of production.
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Agricultural Production Shifts to Larger Farms
Total commodity-related payments and indemnity payments to producers 
change from year to year because of annual market price fluctuations or 
weather conditions. Shifts in the distribution of production among farm sizes 
can also affect the distribution of payments, since receipt of these payments 
depends on current or past production. Agricultural production has in fact 
shifted to larger farms over the past 20 years, continuing an earlier trend. 
Figure 4 shows the distribution of agricultural production by sales class for 
selected years from 1991 to 2009.6 
Shifts in Production
Between 1991 and 2009, production shifted to larger farms. In 1991, family 
farms with production of more than $1,000,000 (in 2009 dollars) accounted 
for 21 percent of total production. By 2009, this sales class accounted for 
39 percent of production. Family farms with production of $500,000 to just 
under $1 million also increased their share of the total production over this 
period. In contrast, small commercial family farms—with annual production 
between $10,000 and $249,999—decreased their share of production from 36 
percent in 1991 to 16 percent in 2009. Note that we have adjusted the values 
to 2009 dollars, so that to the extent possible, we track changes in production 
and not changes in prices.
Figure 4 could be misleading in terms of how changes in farm size affect 
the distribution of Government payments, because many of the largest farms 
produce livestock and fruits and vegetables, commodities which are not 
  6The value of production measures 
the value of commodities produced in 
a given year. This differs from annual 
commodity sales to the extent that 
some crop production may be placed 
in storage for sale in a following year, 
while some current crop sales may be 
made out of earlier production held in 
storage. 
Figure 4
Value of production by sales class, 1991, 1997, 2003, and 2009
The share of farms with sales of a million dollars or more increased from 1991 to 2007
 
Note:  Sales classes are expressed in 2009 dollars, using the producer price index for farm 
products (PPIFP) to adjust for price changes.
Source:  USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service and  Economic Research Service, 1991 
Farm Costs and Returns Survey and 1997, 2003, and 2009 Agricultural Resource Management 
Survey.
Percent of U.S. total
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supported by commodity programs. However, the production of specific 
crops covered by Government payments programs also shifted to larger 
farms over this period. Figure 5 shows shares of the total value of produc-
tion of selected program crops7 by sales class. Family farms with values 
of production more than $1 million increased their share of the production 
of program crops from 8 percent in 1991 to 27 percent in 2009. Similarly, 
family farms with annual values of production between $500,000 and $1 
million increased their share of program crop production from 14 percent 
in 1991 to 27 percent in 2009. Over the same period, the shares of the total 
value of production of smaller family farms decreased.
Increasing Enterprise Size
Many farms produce more than one commodity. The value of production 
provides a way to aggregate different commodities in one measure. Since 
the value of production includes both prices and quantities, we have adjusted 
the values to account for inflation (see box “Adjusting for Price Changes”). 
For farms that produce multiple crops, we can also measure the number of 
acres harvested for each crop enterprise or the part of the farm that is devoted 
to production of a particular crop. This allows us to compare production of 
the same commodities in different years, and it avoids the problem of price 
changes inherent in the value of production. 
Examining the percentage of total acres harvested by crop enterprise size 
class supports the conclusions in the previous two paragraphs: agricultural 
  7The selected program crops are 
barley, corn, cotton, oats, peanuts, rice, 
sorghum, soybeans, and wheat.
Figure 5
Value of production of selected program crops1 by sales class, 
1991, 1997, 2003, and 2009
Production of program crops shifted to family farms with sales greater than $500,000
 
Note:  Sales classes are expressed in 2009 dollars, using the producer price index for farm 
products (PPIFP) to adjust for price changes.
1Barley, corn, cotton, oats, peanuts, rice, sorghum, soybeans, and wheat.
Source:  USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service and  Economic Research Service, 1991 
Farm Costs and Returns Survey and 1997, 2003, and 2009 Agricultural Resource Management 
Survey.
Percent of U.S. total















Changing Farm Structure and the Distribution of Farm Payments and Federal Crop Insurance / EIB-91 
Economic Research Service/USDA
production has been shifting to larger farms. Table 4 shows the percentage of 
total acres harvested by crop enterprise size category for 1992 and 2007 for 
selected major program crops.8 For example, the first two rows of the table 
show the percentages of total acres of corn for grain harvested on corn for 
grain enterprises of less than 100 acres, 100 to 499 acres, 500 to 999 acres, 
and corn for grain enterprises larger than 1,000 acres. For every crop except 
oats, a significant percentage of production shifted to larger enterprises 
between 1992 and 2007. 
The final column of the table shows the mid-aggregate enterprise size based 
on acres harvested for each crop in 1992 and 2007. This tracks the changes 
in the distribution of acreage, by crop enterprise size, over time. In tech-
nical terms, the mid-aggregate enterprise size is the median enterprise size, 
weighted by acreage. Half of all acres harvested of a particular crop are on 
enterprises harvesting more acres of the crop than the mid-aggregate size, 
and half are on enterprises harvesting fewer acres. Once again, for all crops 
except oats, between 1992 and 2007 land shifted to significantly larger farms. 
For example, the mid-aggregate corn for grain enterprise doubled from 300 
acres in 1992 to 600 acres in 2007. Even for oats—which had the smallest 
increase—mid-aggregate enterprise size increased by 52 percent. 
  8We chose these years because they are 
the closest Census of Agriculture years 
to 1991 and 2009, the beginning and end 
periods of figures 4 and 5. The Census of 
Agriculture is conducted every 5 years 
and provides comprehensive data on 
harvested acreage, by commodity.
Table 4
Percent of total acres harvested by crop enterprise size category, selected major program crops, 
1992 and 2007
Commodity Year






100 100 to 499 500 to 999
1,000 or 
more
Percent of U.S. total acres harvested Acres
Corn for grain 1992 15.4 54.9 20.7 9.0 100.0 300
2007 7.4 35.0 25.8 31.8 100.0 600
Soybeans 1992 15.6 54.8 19.0 10.6 100.0 300
2007 8.7 41.8 26.3 23.1 100.0 490
Barley 1992 19.0 54.6 16.4 9.9 100.0 256
2007 10.0 45.1 22.6 22.4 100.0 426
Oats 1992 70.5 26.6 2.1 0.8 100.0 50
2007 56.3 36.7 5.6 1.5 100.0 76
Rice 1992 4.3 56.6 25.8 13.2 100.0 400
2007 2.0 29.5 32.4 36.1 100.0 700
Sorghum for grain 1992 15.3 51.5 19.1 14.1 100.0 300
2007 7.5 39.3 24.2 28.9 100.0 532
Wheat, all varieties 1992 10.0 34.9 26.1 29.1 100.0 562
2007 5.9 25.2 21.3 47.5 100.0 910
Peanuts for nuts 1992 22.9 57.7 14.1 5.3 100.0 215
2007 9.8 50.1 23.7 16.4 100.0 362
Cotton, all varieties 1992 4.9 34.8 30.3 29.9 100.0 605
2007 1.8 18.8 24.9 54.5 100.0 1090
Note:  An enterprise is the portion of the farm operation producing a particular commodity. 
1Half of all harvested acres are on enterprises harvesting more acres of the crop than the mid-aggregate size. 
Source:  USDA, Economic Research Service, compiled from USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service’s Census of Agriculture data.20 
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Reasons for the Shift in Production
The higher profitability of larger farms, evidenced by their higher return on 
equity (ROE), likely encourages farms to increase in size (see box “Return 
on Equity”).
Between 1991 and 2009, the median rate of return on equity (ROE) of farms 
with gross farm sales between $100,000 and $250,000 ranged from -2.4 
percent to -1.1 percent (fig. 6).9 Over the same time period, the median ROE 
of farms with more than $1 million in sales ranged between 4.6 percent (in 
2009) and 7.7 percent (in 1991). 
Why are larger farms more profitable? For most program crops, changes in 
technology have tended to favor large-scale farming. For example, larger 
planting and harvesting equipment and more sophisticated measuring and 
monitoring technology may have allowed full-time farmers to manage larger 
operations (Gray and Boehlje, 2007). Larger and more sophisticated equip-
ment has allowed some producers to reduce planting and harvesting time per 
acre by 50 percent over the past 10 years (Bechdol, Gray, and Gloy, 2010). In 
addition, recent research suggests that conservation tillage10 and genetically 
modified (GM) seeds allow farmers to spend fewer hours per acre on crop 
production (Fernandez-Cornejo and McBride, 2002). This may also allow 
full-time farmers to manage larger operations. To the extent that a full-time 
operator’s time is a fixed cost and per-acre costs do not increase with size, 
larger farms will tend to have larger profit margins. 
Demographic change, specifically farm operator age, is also related to the 
shift toward larger farms. Table 5 shows the percentages of principal farm 
operators in each farm sales class that were over 65 years old in 1991, 1997, 
2003, and 2009. A higher percentage of the operators of small commercial 
family farms tend to be over age 65. When the older operators of small 
  9We used the median, rather than 
the average, because the average is 
affected by extreme “outlier” observa-
tions. Since the ROE is a ratio, values 
of the denominator (net worth) close to 
zero can cause very large (positive or 
negative) ROE values. These outliers do 
not reflect the majority of farms, so we 
use the median instead of the average to 
reflect the center of the distribution of 
farms within each sales class.
  10Conservation tillage practices 
reduce soil erosion by water or wind by 
leaving more crop residue on the fields 
between harvest and planting. These 
practices generally require less plow-
ing (fewer passes over the field) than 
conventional tillage practices. 
Return on Equity 
A farm’s return on equity (ROE) measures the farm’s profitability as the ratio 
of net farm income, adjusted for unpaid labor (including management and 
operator labor), over the farm’s net worth. We multiply this ratio by 100 to put 
the numbers in percentage terms. Net farm income is the difference between 
gross farm income and expenses. Expenses include cash operating expenses, 
depreciation, and in-kind benefits provided to employees. Unincorporated 
farms do not deduct any explicit expenses for unpaid operator labor, the 
unpaid labor of nonoperators, or for farm management in the farm income 
measures generated from the Agricultural Resource Management Survey 
(ARMS). For unincorporated farms, charges for these inputs are deducted 
from net farm income to reflect the opportunity cost of these inputs. The 
charges for unpaid operator labor and unpaid nonoperator labor are each 
calculated as the total hours worked by those individuals multiplied by the 
wage rate for farm labor. The charge for management is computed as 5 
percent of the net value of production. In layman’s terms, return on equity 
measures how much profit (or loss if negative) a farm generates per unit of 
financial investment (equity).21 
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commercial farms retire, their farms often are not continued as separate busi-
nesses, due to the low profitability of operations of that size (see figure 6).11 
The land from these farms then either becomes part of another operation or is 
taken out of production. It is not clear from these simple descriptive statistics 
whether demographic change is contributing to the shift of production toward 
larger farms, or just another reflection of it.
  11Also see Hoppe and Banker (2006), 
pages 7-9, and MacDonald, Hoppe, and 
Banker (2006).
Figure 6
Median rates of return on equity by farm sales class, 1991-2009
Larger farms have higher rates of return on equity
 
Note: Sales classes are expressed in 2009 dollars, using the producer price index  (PPI) for 
farm products to adjust for price changes.
Source:  USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service and  Economic Research Service, 
1991 Farm Costs and Returns Survey and 1997, 2003, and 2009 Agricultural Resource 
Management Survey.
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Principal operators over age 65, by sales class, 1991, 1997, 2003, and 2009
Item 1991 1997 2003 2009
Percent of principal operators 
Principal operator 65 years old or older 25.4 27.3 26.5 30.3
   Less than $10,000 31.0 31.9 27.7 31.3
   $10,000-$99,999 26.9 28.4 31.0 35.6
   $100,000-$249,999 11.4 15.8 17.6 24.4
   $250,000-$499,999 8.2 13.4 15.6 18.4
   $500,000-$999,999 12.8 10.5 12.3 16.1
   $1,000,000 or more 15.7 14.5 13.1 14.9
   Nonfamily 14.0 16.0 22.9 24.3
Note:  Sales classes are expressed in 2009 dollars, using the producer price index (PPI) for 
farm products to adjust for price changes. 
Source:  USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service and Economic Research Service, 1991 
Farm Costs and Returns Survey and 1997, 2003, and 2009 Agricultural Resource Manage-
ment Survey.22 
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Shifts in Program Payments and Federal Indemnity 
Payments
Commodity program payments are based on current or past production of 
program commodities. As production of these commodities shifts to larger 
farms, so do commodity-related program payments. Figure 7 shows the 
distribution of commodity-related Government payments by sales class 
for 1991 and 2009. These 2 years represent the earliest and latest years for 
which we have consistent data from the FCRS and ARMS. The shifts in 
commodity-related payments among sales classes are similar to the shifts in 
production in figure 5. By 2009, farms with gross sales of $1 million or more 
received 23 percent of all commodity-related payments, up from 8 percent 
in 1991. A similar shift occurred for farms with sales between $500,000 and 
$999,999. In contrast, the share of commodity-related payments received by 
farms in the $100,000 to $249,999 sales class shrank from 34 percent in 1991 
to 15 percent in 2009.
The situation was different for land-retirement payments, which largely came 
from the CRP. Figure 8 shows the distribution of Government land-retire-
ment payments by sales class for 1991 and 2009. Land-retirement programs 
target environmentally sensitive land, so the distribution of payments from 
these programs differs from those from commodity programs. Family farms 
with sales less than $10,000 (noncommercial farms) nearly doubled their 
share of land-retirement payments from 16 percent to 30 percent. From 1991 
to 2009, the share of noncommercial farms participating in land-retirement 
Figure 7
Commodity-related payments by farm sales class, 1991 and 2009
Payments shifted to family farms with sales greater than $500,000 
 
Note:  Sales classes are expressed in 2009 dollars, using the producer price index for farm 
products (PPIFP) to adjust for price changes.
Sales classes are in the same order, top to bottom, in the legend as in the stacked bars.
Source:  USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service and  Economic Research Service, 1991 
Farm Costs and Returns Survey and 2009 Agricultural Resource Management Survey.
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programs increased from about 9 percent to about 14 percent. Over the 
same period, among noncommercial farms participating in land-retirement 
programs, the average share of acreage enrolled—the ratio of the acres 
enrolled to total acres operated—increased from 36 percent to 46 percent for 
participating farms. Note that retiring a substantial share of a small farm’s 
land can move a farm into the noncommercial class.12 Some of the shift of 
payments to noncommercial farms reflects older farmers with small commer-
cial farms scaling their operations down by enrolling in the CRP.
Working-lands programs accounted for a small portion of conserva-
tion payments until after 2002, when they began to expand. Unlike most 
Government payments programs, a portion of working-lands programs (a 
minimum of 60 percent of EQIP payments) are required to be allocated for 
livestock practices.13 In addition, working-land programs, unlike commodity-
related programs, reduce the cost of implementing conservation practices and 
so do not provide income-support to farm operators. Examining benefits from 
these programs in the early years is difficult when using a sample survey 
like the ARMS, because only a small percentage of farms participated in the 
programs. So we cannot give an accurate picture of the changes in working-
land payments over the 1991 to 2009 period.
However, we can get an accurate snapshot from the 2009 ARMS data 
because a larger percentage of farms participated in working-land programs 
in that year than in earlier years. In 2009, most working-land payments 
went to large and very large farms, just as we saw with commodity-related 
payments (fig. 9). For example, although family farms with sales between 
  12For example, if a 160-acre farm 
produces 75 bushels of corn per acre 
(half the average U.S. yield) at $4 per 
bushels, the farm generates $48,000 of 
gross revenue. If the entire farm were 
placed in the CRP at the average U.S. 
CRP rental payment ($51 per acre in 
2008), gross revenue falls to $8,160. 
  13Between 2004 and 2008, 65-68 
percent of EQIP funds were allocated 
to livestock-related practices. 
Figure 8
Land-retirement payments by farm sales class, 1991 and 2009
Payments to family farms with sales less than $10,000 nearly doubled 
 
Note:  Sales classes are expressed in 2009 dollars, using the producer price index for farm 
products (PPIFP) to adjust for price changes.
Sales classes are in the same order, top to bottom, in the legend as in the stacked bars.
Source:  USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service and  Economic Research Service, 1991 
Farm Costs and Returns Survey and 2009 Agricultural Resource Management Survey.
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$500,000 and $999,999 accounted for only 3 percent of farms in 2009, as a 
group, they received almost 25 percent of working-land payments that year. 
Family farms with sales of $1 million or more accounted for 2 percent of 
farms, but received 18 percent of working-land payments. 
On the other hand, when the distribution of payments is compared with the 
distribution of production—rather than the distribution of farms—all but the 
largest farms receive a larger share of working-land payments than their share 
of production. For example, farms with gross sales of $1 million or more 
produced 39 percent of the total value of production in 2009, but received only 
18 percent of working-land payments (see figure 4). In contrast, farms in the 
$500,000 to $1 million sales class produced 18 percent of the value of produc-
tion, but received 25 percent of working-land payments. 
The distribution of working-land payments by sales class in 2009 was quite 
similar to that of commodity-related payments (see figures 7 and 9). Roughly 
one-third of payments from both types of programs went to family farms 
with sales less than $250,000, two-fifths went to family farms with sales 
between $250,000 and $999,000, and one-fifth went to family farms selling 
more than $1 million. 
Figure 9
Working-land payments by farm sales class, 2009
Forty-three percent of payments go to family farms with sales over $500,000 
 
Note:  Sales classes are expressed in 2009 dollars, using the producer price index for farm 
products (PPIFP) to adjust for price changes.
Sales classes are in the same order, top to bottom, in the legend as in the stacked bars.
Source:  USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service and  Economic Research Service, 2009 
Agricultural Resource Management Survey.
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As production has shifted to larger farms, Federal indemnity payments 
have shifted to larger farms (fig. 10), as was the case for commodity-related 
payments. In 1997, small commercial farms received about 58 percent of 
Federal crop insurance indemnity payments. By 2009, their share had shrunk 
to about 25 percent.14 Consequently, family farms with sales over $500,000 
increased their share of total Federal indemnity payments from about 18 
percent in 1997 to about 49 percent in 2009.15 
  14We choose the years 1997 and 2009 
because these are the earliest and latest 
years for which we have consistent data 
on Federal indemnity payments in the 
ARMS data.
  15However, as noted above, un-
like Government payments, Federal 
indemnity payments are not Govern-
ment support per se. Premium subsidies 
would be a better measure of Govern-
ment support provided by Federal 
crop insurance. However, the ARMS 
does not collect data about premium 
subsidies, and the ARMS is the only 
national survey that collects data on 
Federal crop insurance, farm size, and 
farm household income.
Figure 10
Federal indemnity payments by farm sales class, 1997 and 2009
Payments shifted to family farms with sales greater than $500,000 
 
 
Note:  Sales classes are expressed in 2009 dollars, using the producer price index for farm 
products (PPIFP) to adjust for price changes.
Sales classes are in the same order, top to bottom, in the legend as in the stacked bars.
Source:  USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service and  Economic Research Service, 1997  
and 2009 Agricultural Resource Management Survey.
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Payments Shift to Higher Income Households
Farm household income is not the same as farm sales. In the ARMS, farm 
sales are the sum of the farm’s crop sales, livestock sales, and Government 
payments—plus the contractor’s share of production and the landlord’s share 
of production and Government payments, if the farm has any contractors 
or landlords. Sales represent gross revenue generated from commodities 
produced on the farm, regardless of who actually receives the revenue. 
Operator household income in the ARMS is an entirely different concept. 
Rather than measuring gross revenues, operator household income measures 
the income available to the principal operator’s household. It has three 
components: (1) net income from the farm business, (2) income from other 
farming activities, and (3) income from off-farm sources. 
•	 Farm business income. The household’s farm business income is calcu-
lated as its share of net cash income generated by the farm. Net cash 
income is gross cash farm income—the sum of sales of commodities, 
other miscellaneous farm-related income, and Government payments—
less cash expenses.16 The principal operator household does not neces-
sarily receive all the business income generated by its farm. For example, 
business income may be shared with partners or relatives who hold an 
interest in the farm. 
•	 Income from other farming activities. This component consists of net 
income from a farm business other than the one being surveyed in the 
ARMS, wages paid by the farm business to household members other 
than the operator, and net income from farmland rental.
•	 Off-farm income. Off-farm income can come from earned sources, 
such as wages, salaries, and self-employment income, or from unearned 
sources, such as interest, dividends, and transfer payments, such as 
Social Security.
Figure 11 diagrams the flow of income to operator households and other 
households. Note that not all operator households receive income from all 
sources, and for some farms net income from the farm business is shared 
with other households. For farms at the lower end of the size spectrum—
sales less than $10,000, for example—sales are typically far less than house-
hold income, due to off-farm income received by the principal operator 
household. At the other end of the spectrum—where sales exceed $1 million, 
for example—sales are typically greater than operator household income. At 
that level, most household income comes from farming.
Household Income Varies by Sales Class
The overall shift of production to larger farms has led to a shift of payments 
to higher income households, since households operating large or very large 
farms tend to have higher income than households operating small commer-
cial farms (fig. 12). For example, the median operator household income of 
family farms with sales between $10,000 and $99,999 in 2009 was about 
$51,000, slightly above the median income of all U.S. households, which was 
$49,777. In contrast, the median operator household income of farms with 
16ARMS also deducts depreciation 
in calculating the household’s farm 
business income. Depreciation is not a 
cash expense, but it is deducted to be 
consistent with accounting conventions 
used in the Current Population Survey 
(CPS). The CPS is the source of official 
income statistics for the United States.27 
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Figure 11
The flow of income to family farm households
Household recipients of income
Sources of income
 
Note: Not all farm households receive income from all sources.
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service.
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farm business 
Figure 12
Median operator household income by source and sales class, 2009
Larger farms tend to have higher operator household income
 
Dollars (thousand)
Note:  Half of the households earn less than the median income, while the other half earn more. Medians are often used to summarize 
household income because its skewed distribution. Household income is estimated only for family farms.
Source: USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service and Economic Research Service, 2009 Agricultural Resource Management Survey, 
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sales between $500,000 and $999,999 in 2009 was about $127,000, and for 
farms with sales of $1 million or more, median operator household income 
was $161,000. 
The figure also shows that operators of larger farms tend to have higher farm 
earnings and lower off-farm income than the operators of smaller farms. 
For example, the median off-farm income of operators of farms with sales 
between $10,000 and $100,000 in 2009 was $55,000. The median off-farm 
income of operators of farms with gross sales of $1 million or more was only 
$26,250. So the operators of large and very large farms tend to earn most 
of their income from the farm, whereas the operators of small farms—even 
small commercial farms—tend to earn most of their income off-farm.
Figure 12 also shows that the median farm earnings of noncommercial 
farms and the smallest commercial farms are negative. Farm households can 
have negative farm earnings or even negative household income for several 
reasons. Even large and commercially successful farms could have negative 
farm incomes because of natural disasters or because of poor business years. 
They could also have negative incomes because they have yet to sell all of 
their commodities at the time that the survey is conducted. Finally, some 
farms with substantial recent investments in structures or equipment can 
claim high depreciation expenses for tax purposes, and therefore have nega-
tive farm incomes. For households with limited off-farm incomes, net farm 
incomes can drive estimated household incomes.
Commodity-Related Payments
Since the operators of larger farms tend to have higher incomes, the shift of 
commodity-related payments to larger farms led to a shift of payments to 
higher income households. Table 6 shows the principal operator household 
income at selected percentiles of the commodity-related payments distri-
bution for selected years between 1991 and 2009, as well as the median 
income for all U.S. households in those years. In 1991, half of commodity 
payments went to farms operated by households with incomes over $54,940 
in constant 2009 dollars (50th percentile), a quarter of commodity payments 
went to farms operated by households with incomes greater than $115,000 
(75th percentile), and 10 percent went to farms operated by households with 
incomes over $229,000 (90th percentile). According to the U.S. Census 
Bureau’s Current Population Survey, in 1991 the median household income 
among all U.S. households (in 2009 dollars) was $47,453, reasonably 
close to the household income at the midpoint of the commodity payments 
distribution. 
However, by 2009, the distribution of payments shifted upward. Half of 
commodity payments went to farms operated by households with incomes 
over $89,540, a quarter went to farms operated by households with incomes 
greater than $209,000 and 10 percent went to farms operated by households 
with incomes greater than or equal to $425,000. In 2009, the median house-
hold income among all U.S. households was $49,777, practically the same 
as in 1991. Because of the shift in commodity payments to higher income 
households, most commodity-related payments in recent years went to house-
holds with incomes that are significantly higher than the incomes of most 
U.S. households. 29 
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Effects of Increases in Commodity Prices
While there were strong structural trends in U.S. agriculture between 1991 
and 2009—for example, production is moving to larger farms—there were 
also sharp year-to-year fluctuations in commodity prices. Prices for program 
crops are determined in global markets, and thus a variety of domestic and 
international factors can affect those prices. For example, the weakening U.S. 
dollar between 2001 and 2008 caused U.S. commodities to be more competi-
tive in international markets, thus increasing demand for those commodities. 
Weather in other parts of the world can also affect U.S. commodity prices. 
In 2006 and 2007, droughts, floods, high temperatures, and freezes adversely 
affected agricultural production in an unusually large number of countries 
around the world. In response to high commodity prices and a fear of short-
ages, in 2007, several large countries—including India and China—raised 
export taxes and restricted exports of agricultural commodities. The U.S. 
Energy Policy Act of 2005 mandated that 7.5 billion gallons of renew-
able fuels be used in gasoline by 2012. This was increased still further by 
the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA), which led to a 
rapid expansion of U.S. corn-based ethanol production, which increased the 
demand for corn. 
All of these factors contributed to an increase in crop commodity prices 
in 2007 and 2008.17 For example, the average price of U.S. corn for grain 
increased from $2.05 per bushel in June 2005 to a peak of $5.47 per bushel 
in June 2008. For livestock producers, the situation was more mixed, since 
increases in feed prices outpaced increases in the prices they received for 
their products. For example, the feed price ratio for hogs (defined as the 
bushels of corn equal in value to 100 pounds of live weight hog) fell from 
25.3 in 2005 to 10 in 2008.18 
Since we are interested in shifts in production, we control for price changes 
to the extent possible through price adjustments, as discussed in the box 
“Adjusting for Price Changes.” However, farm earnings to the household are 
not adjusted for farm commodity price changes. As a result, an increase in 
  17For more information on factors 
contributing to recent increases in food 
commodity prices, see Trostle (2008).
  18For monthly prices for corn, grain, 
and other commodities and annual feed 




Changes in the distribution of commodity payments
Operator household income levels at selected percentile levels 
Percentiles of the distribution of 
commodity-related payments
Operator household income Change, 
1991 to 2009 1991 1997 2003 2007 2008 2009
Constant 2009 dollars Percent
25th percentile 18,237 16,269 29,353 34,396 32,365 24,773 35.8
50th percentile 54,940 64,837 87,210 112,712 116,249 89,540 63.0
75th percentile 115,028 143,263 177,862 281,877 280,737 209,195 81.9
90th percentile 229,040 291,603 384,102 573,962 584,398 425,000 85.6
Median Income, All U.S. households 47,453 49,464 50,507 51,976 50,124 49,777 4.9
Note: All household income estimates are expressed in 2009 dollars, using the consumer price index (CPI-U).
Source:  USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service and Economic Research Service, 1991 Farm Costs and Returns Survey and 1997, 
2003, 2007, 2008, and 2009 Agricultural Resource Management Survey; and U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, Current 
Population Survey for all U.S. households.30 
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commodity prices can cause an increase in farm income. For example, ERS 
estimated aggregate net farm income was $70.9 billion in 2007 and $87.1 
billion in 2008, but only $62.2 billion in 2009.19 Table 6 shows the effects of 
high commodity prices in 2007 and 2008. Most farms receiving commodity-
related payments had unusually high income in those years because of 
high commodity prices. Thus, in those years, commodity-related payments 
shifted even more strongly toward higher income households. For example, 
10 percent of commodity-related payments in 2008 went to farms operated 
by households earning over $584,000, which was more than 10 times the 
median income among all U.S. households in that year. 
Conservation Payments
Land-retirement payments tend to go to households with lower incomes 
(table 7)—especially when compared with households receiving commodity-
related payments. Although land-retirement payments have shifted toward 
higher income households, the shift has not been as large as that for 
commodity-related payments. However, even for land-retirement programs, 
a significant percentage of payments go to high-income households. In 2009, 
for example, 10 percent of land-retirement payments went to farms operated 
by households with incomes over $203,000. 
Next we turn to working-lands programs. Until recently, working-lands 
programs were small compared with other payments programs. This makes it 
difficult to examine the distribution of working-lands payments in the early 
years of the programs using the ARMS survey. Currently, these payments 
tend to go to farms operated by higher income households (table 8). Half of 
working-land payments went to farms operated by households with $78,464 
or more income, a quarter went to farms operated by households making at 
least $205,000 and 10 percent of these payments went to farms operated by 
households with income greater than or equal to $436,191.
Federal Crop Insurance Indemnities
As Federal indemnity payments shifted to larger farms, the indemnity 
payments also shifted to higher income households (fig. 13). The share of 
  19These estimates are from the Farm 
Sector Accounts for 2007-2008.
Table 7
Changes in the distribution of land-retirement programs
Operator household income levels at selected percentile levels
Percentiles of the distribution of land-
retirement payments
Operator household income Change, 
1991 to 2009 1991 1997 2003 2007 2008 2009
Constant 2009 dollars Percent
25th percentile 28,356 23,443 32,441 41,026 30,765 38,704 36.5
50th percentile 48,825 59,357 60,129 75,846 57,670 59,000 20.8
75th percentile 80,125 102,062 100,892 136,749 113,905 116,949 46.0
90th percentile 157,289 157,405 181,273 263,169 232,862 203,335 29.3
Note: All household income estimates are expressed in 2009 dollars, using the consumer price index (CPI-U).
Source:  USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service and Economic Research Service, 1991 Farm Costs and Returns Survey and 1997, 
2003, 2007, 2008, and 2009 Agricultural Resource Management Survey; and U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, Current 
Population Survey for all U.S. households.31 
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Federal indemnity payments received by households with incomes less than 
$50,000 shrank from about 47 percent in 1997 to about 29 percent in 2009. 
Over the same period, the share received by households with income greater 
than $500,000 increased from about 7 percent to about 13 percent, and the share 
received by households with income between $200,000 and $500,000 increased 
from 14 to 23 percent. 
Table 8
Changes in the distribution of working-land programs
Operator household income levels at selected percentile levels
Percentiles of the distribution of 
working-land payments
Operator household income
1991 1997 2003 2007 2008 2009
Constant 2009 dollars
25th percentile na na na 36,684 30,931 27,247
50th percentile na na na 95,970 94,148 78,464
75th percentile na na na 164,058 209,396 205,000
90th percentile na na na 385,983 537,526 436,191
Note: All household income estimates are expressed in 2009 dollars, using the consumer price index (CPI-U).
na = data not available. Total working-land payments were too small in 2003 and earlier years to estimate an accurate distribution from ARMS 
data.
Source:  USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service and Economic Research Service, 1991 Farm Costs and Returns Survey and 1997, 
2003, 2007, 2008, and 2009 Agricultural Resource Management Survey.
Figure 13
Federal indemnity payments by household income class, 1997 and 2009




Note:  Household income classes are expressed in 2009 dollars, using the consumer price 
index (CPI-U) to adjust for price changes.
Income classes are in the same order, top to bottom, in the legend as in the stacked bars.
Source:  USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service and  Economic Research Service, 1997 
and 2009 Agricultural Resource Management Survey.
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Some Caveats
Structural change is shifting production to larger farms. This means Government 
payments and Federal indemnities are shifting to larger farms, since most 
Government payments are tied directly or indirectly to production. In addition, 
since operators of larger farms tend to have higher household income, payments 
and indemnities are shifting to higher income households. When examining 
the shift of Government payments toward higher income households, however, 
there are two caveats to keep in mind. 
First, the ARMS data identifies Government payments accruing to the farm 
business, but it does not track payments to households. The ARMS tracks the 
incomes of principal operator households, but we do not know if the principal 
operator household receives all the Government payments accruing to the farm 
business. The payments may be shared with junior partners or stockholders, for 
example. While the ARMS data does not allow us to track payments to house-
holds, it does allow us to say what percent of farm households share income 
with other households (table 9). The percentage rises with farm sales class 
in each year. For example, in 2009 only 4.7 percent of operators of noncom-
mercial farms shared income with other households, but in each higher income 
class a successively higher percentage of farm operator households shared 
income with other households. For example, 23 percent of operators of farms 
with sales between $500,000 and $1,000,000 and 33 percent of the operator 
households of farms with gross sales of $1,000,000 or more shared income 
with other households. 
Second, although Government payments to farms generally involve a net 
transfer of wealth from taxpayers to the farm sector, they are not a transfer 
payment like Social Security, where the entire amount is available for household 
spending. Costs often must be incurred before a farm household receives most 
types of Government payments. For example, production expenses are incurred 
to produce commodities in order to receive LDPs. Payments increase the farm 
operator’s revenue, but they may also increase the operator’s expenses, espe-
cially cash-rents for land. Even direct payments, which do not require the oper-
ator to produce, increase the cash-rents of the land attached to the payments. 
Table 9  
Farm households sharing income, by sales class
Multiple households often share in net income from larger farms
Farm sales class 2007 2008 2009
Percent
   All 10.4 6.2 7.8
   Less than $10,000 6.7 3.0 4.7
   $10,000 to $99,999 12.2 8.0 8.2
   $100,000-$249,999 16.8 10.7 12.3
   $250,000-$499,999 20.8 15.0 17.4
   $500,000-$999,999 24.9 22.6 23.3
   $1,000,000 or more 37.8 34.0 33.0
Note: The table shows percentages of principal operator households in each sales class  
sharing income with one or more other households. Sales classes are expressed in 2009 dol-
lars, using the producer price index to adjust for price changes. 
Source: USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service and Economic Research Service, 2007, 
2008, 2009 Agricultural Resource Management Survey, all versions.33 
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Current and Proposed Income Eligibility Caps and 
Payment Limits for Receipt of Government Payments
The 2002 Farm Act included various provisions restricting higher income 
individuals’ and legal entities’ eligibility for payments. The 2008 Farm Act 
tightened some of these restrictions. For example, under the 2002 Act, to be 
eligible for payments, an individual’s or legal entity’s average adjusted gross 
income (AGI) for the 3 tax years prior to the applicable program year had to 
be less than $2.5 million, unless at least 75 percent of the average AGI was 
derived from farming, ranching, or forestry.20 Under the 2008 Act, to receive 
direct or counter-cyclical payments, ACRE payments, marketing loan gains, 
loan deficiency payments, Milk Income Loss Contract (MILC) payments, 
or selected disaster assistance payments, a recipient’s 3-year average AGI 
from nonfarm sources must be no more than $500,000. In addition, to receive 
direct payments, the applicable 3-year average AGI from farming must be 
no more than $750,000. To receive conservation payments, the recipient’s 
average nonfarm AGI may not exceed $1,000,000, unless at least two-thirds 
of average total AGI is derived from farming, ranching, or forestry. 
Previous research on the effects of income caps and payment limits has used 
three different data sources—the ARMS, administrative data from USDA’s 
Farm Service Agency (FSA), and IRS tax return data. Among other things, 
FSA’s administrative data tracks payments, land parcels in farms, and produc-
tion outcomes necessary to administer farm programs. The FSA definition of 
a farm differs from the ARMS definition. Typically a single ARMS farm may 
consist of several FSA-defined farms in the FSA administrative data.21,22 As 
a result, farm counts based on FSA administrative data are higher than farm 
counts based on ARMS or Census data. ARMS and FSA data also differ in 
other respects. Household incomes in the ARMS are self-reported and are not 
the same as AGI. However, in the ARMS, we can more easily tie elements 
of the farm business and operator’s household to program payments than is 
possible with administrative data.
Previous research suggests that statutory income caps in place or proposed 
at the time the research was conducted affected few farmers and farmland 
owners and a small fraction of payments. Using ARMS data and tabulated 
data from the IRS, Durst (2007) examined the Bush Administration’s 2007 
farm bill proposal to reduce the AGI eligibility cap to $200,000 and elimi-
nate the exception for those with 75 percent or more of their income from 
farming, ranching, or forestry. The proposed eligibility cap would have 
applied only to farm commodity payments. Durst found it unlikely that the 
lower AGI cap would have affected more than about 1 percent of farm sole 
proprietorships and about 2 percent of crop share landlords. Using FSA 
administrative data matched to IRS tax return data, a 2008 Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) report found that of the 1.8 million individuals 
receiving Government payments between 2003 and 2006, about 2,700 had 
a 3-year average AGI over the $2.5 million income cap and derived less 
than 75 percent of their income from farming, ranching, or forestry.23 In 
summary, both the GAO report and Durst (2007) concluded that only a very 
small fraction of farm households or individuals is affected by the income 
caps. The ARMS data used in this report reinforce those conclusions. 
  20AGI is income that is used to 
determine the household’s income tax 
liability. AGI is equal to the house-
hold’s gross income (the sum of wages 
and salaries, interest income, dividends, 
capital gains, etc.) minus deductions 
such as contributions to retirement 
accounts, self-employment taxes, etc. 
AGI is calculated on Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) tax forms. 
  21A farm business typically grows by 
buying or renting land that was previ-
ously operated by another farm busi-
ness. The newly added land may have a 
different payment yield associated with 
it than the acquiring farm’s original 
land. The acquiring farm has the legal 
right to keep the farms separate for pay-
ment purposes.
  22In some cases, an FSA-defined farm 
may represent portions of more than one 
ARMS-defined farm and vice versa.
  23The GAO report recommended 
tighter USDA controls to prevent 
payments to individuals who exceed 
income eligibility limits. In response 
USDA worked with IRS to develop 
an electronic information exchange 
process for the purposes of average AGI 
cap verification. USDA receives indica-
tions of whether or not the participant 
appears to exceed the average AGI 
caps, but does not receive any tax data. 
For further details see the FSA website 
at http://www.fsa.usda.gov/.34 
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The caps in the 2008 Farm Act continue to affect very few farm households. 
For example, based on the income of principal operator households, only 
about 0.8 percent of farm households that received direct payments potentially 
had income above the cap, although their share of payments was somewhat 
higher, about 3.8 percent (fig. 14). Of course, some individuals may have been 
prevented from receiving payments because of the income eligibility criteria, 
and thus would not be counted in figure 14. However, previous research 
suggests that only a small percentage of farms were prevented from receiving 
payments. According to the 2009 ARMS, only 0.2 percent of all farm house-
holds, or about 5,200 households, had farm income greater than $750,000 in 
2009. The other income caps appear to affect a similarly small fraction of farm 
households. Again based on principal operator households, only 0.3 percent 
of farm households receiving direct and counter-cyclical payments had off-
farm income of $500,000 or more (fig. 15), and less than 1 percent of farm 
households receiving conservation payments had nonfarm income of at least 
$1 million.24 Among all family farms—not just those receiving payments—in 
2009, about 0.8 percent had off-farm income greater than $500,000, and about 
0.4 percent had off-farm income greater than $1 million. 
Although figures 14 and 15 show a few farms with incomes potentially above 
the caps, receipt of payments by these high-income households is permis-
sible for two reasons. First, the average AGI caps apply to individuals and 
legal entities,25 and these figures show self-reported income for households. 
Married couples may be able to divide farm income between spouses if both 
are actively engaged in farming. Each spouse can be counted as a separate 
recipient, so the effective farm income cap for a household consisting of a 
married couple is potentially twice the statutory cap. Second, farm income 
in the ARMS is not the same as AGI, and the income caps are based on AGI 
over the preceding 3-year period (2006-2008 tax years for 2009 payments). 
  24The statistics cited in this para-
graph were computed from the 2009 
ARMS Phase III using all versions of 
the survey.
  25While the income caps and payment 
limits apply to individuals and legal 
entities, FSA requires legal entities 
receiving Government payments to 
apportion those payments to individual 
taxpayers. If legal entities pass Govern-
ment payments to other legal entities, the 
second- and third-level entities also have 
to apportion payments to individuals.
Figure 14
Direct payments and principal farm operator households, by income received from farming, 2009  
 
Percent
Note: Even households earning more than $750,000 from farming may be eligible for payments. The farming income eligibility cap applies to 
individuals, and this chart uses the farming income of households. Multiple individuals in a household may be actively involved in operating a 
farm and have incomes below the cap; they would be eligible to receive payments even if the household’s total income from farming exceeded 
$750,000.
Source: USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service and Economic Research Service, 2009 Agricultural Resource Management Survey.
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Since 2006-2008 was a period of generally increasing—and high—grain 
prices and thus high grain-farmer income, more operator households might 
have had unusually high incomes during this period relative to earlier 
periods. On the other hand, as noted above, ARMS data tracks payments to 
the farm, and the income of the principal operator’s household. The ARMS 
data do not track junior partners or stockholders associated with the farm 
(but not part of the farm household). If these junior partners or stockholders 
are not principal operators of other surveyed farms, then the ARMS does not 
count how many of these individuals might be affected by the income caps. 
If the shift in agricultural production toward larger farms, and thus higher 
income households, continues—which seems likely—it is possible that the 
current payment limits and income caps will become binding for a larger 
number of individuals and entities, and presumably farm households. 
However, given the separate caps for farm and nonfarm income, the ability to 
allocate ownership shares of the farm (and thus to effectively split payments) 
between family members and business associates, and the 3-year average 
AGI rule, a farm household’s income would have to be high for several years 
before the income cap would affect eligibility. For example, a married couple 
could have a combined AGI of $2.5 million ($500,000 each from nonfarm 
sources and $750,000 each from farming) every year for 3 years and still 
potentially be eligible for most Government payments.
The Obama Administration has proposed lowering income caps. The 
Administration’s budget for fiscal year 2012 proposed limiting direct payments 
to individuals with 3-year average AGI of no more than $500,000 from 
farming, down from the current limit of $750,000. For married couples, since 
Figure 15





Note: Even households earning more than $500,000 from nonfarm sources may be eligible for payments. The nonfarm income eligibility cap 
applies to individuals, and this chart uses the nonfarm income of households. Multiple individuals in a household may be actively involved in 
operating a farm and have incomes below the cap; they would be eligible to receive payments even if the household’s total nonfarm income 
exceeded $500,000.
Source:  USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service and Economic Research Service, 2009 Agricultural Resource Management Survey.
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both spouses can potentially receive payments, the effective farm AGI cap for 
married couples could be $1 million. In addition, the budget proposed limiting 
direct payment program eligibility to individuals with average nonfarm AGI 
of no more than $250,000 (potentially up to $500,000 for married couples). In 
2009, approximately 2 percent of family farms receiving direct payments—
about 11,000 farms—had principal operator households with farm income over 
$500,000, accounting for roughly 7 percent of direct payments. In the same 
year, roughly 3,000 farms receiving direct payments had principal operator 
households with incomes over $1 million, accounting for about 3 percent of 
direct payments to family farms. Thus, based on 2009 ARMS data, neither of 
the proposed AGI caps would affect a large number of farms or appreciably 
alter the overall distribution of farm program payments. 
Because of price increases and the shift of production toward larger farms 
operated by higher income households, it is likely that lowering the AGI 
eligibility cap today would affect a larger percentage of payments and farms 
than we estimate based on the 2009 ARMS data. While farms can often 
smooth income across years to reduce AGI during high-earning years, the 
recent string of high-income years enjoyed by most program-eligible crop 
producers reduces the impact of income averaging. Average AGI cannot be 
reduced by prepaying production expenses in the current tax year or delaying 
crop sales until the following tax year if income is consistently high in all 3 
years. Farm operators can significantly reduce average AGI by purchasing 
farm equipment—the depreciation of farm equipment can be deducted from 
AGI over multiple years—but there is a limit to how much farm equipment 
can be profitably used. 
Payment Limits
In addition to income eligibility caps, Congress has enacted payment limits. 
The 2008 Farm Act included a $40,000 limit on direct payments to indi-
viduals and entities, a $65,000 limit on CCPs, and other payment limits on 
ACRE, CRP, and disaster assistance programs such as SURE. Since spouses 
may have a separate limit, married couples could receive up to $80,000 of 
direct payments and $130,000 of CCPs (see the box on “Payment Limits 
Under the 2008 Farm Act”). Table 10 shows the number of farms, the 
percentage of payment-receiving farms, and the percentage of payments 
that might be affected by these and other payment limits. In 2009, direct and 
counter-cyclical payments to farms that, if accruing to the principal operator, 
exceeded these limits accounted for a significant fraction of payments, but 
only a small percentage of farms. To summarize, in 2009, among farms 
receiving direct payments:
•	Only	3	percent	(approximately	14,700	farms)	received	direct	payments	
of more than $40,000; total direct payments to these farms accounted for 
about 28 percent of direct payments. 
•	About	1	percent	(roughly	3,800	farms)	received	direct	payments	of	more	
than $80,000; total direct payments to these farms accounted for approxi-
mately 12 percent of direct payments.37 
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Table 10 
Farms and payments potentially affected by payment limits 
Type of payment
Year  







Direct payments 2009 Individuals*** $30,000  25,836 6 39
Married couples $60,000  7,569 2 19
Individuals $40,000  14,695 3 28
Married couples $80,000  3,838 1 12
Counter-cyclical payments 2005 Individuals $65,000  4,621 2 23
Married couples $130,000  1,099 <1 10
2009 Individuals $65,000  1,506 1 29
Married couples $130,000  517 <1 16
LDPs/Marketing loan gains 2005 Individuals $150,000  1,278 <1 9
2009 Individuals $150,000  112 2 17
*Percent of farms is the percentage among farms that receive the specified type of payment.
**Percent of payments is the percentage of payments of the specified type.
***Individuals = counts and percentages for households with payments above the individual limit. 
LDPs = Loan deficiency payments.
Source:  USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service and Economic Research Service, 2005 and 2009 Agricultural Resource Management 
Survey, all versions.
Payment Limits Under the 2008 Farm Act
By Terry Hickenbotham (Terry.Hickenbotham@wdc.usda.gov) 
The 2008 Farm Act mandated that payments be “directly attributed” to individuals and legal entities such that the 
limits would be applied, starting with the 2009 program year, to the total direct and indirect payments for each 
individual and entity. Under direct attribution, if a payee is an entity, then the entity’s payments are disaggregated 
among its members based on the members’ ownership shares. If a first-level entity (an entity to which a proposed 
payment may be made) is partially or wholly owned by one or more entities, then the indirect payments for that 
second-level entity (those entities) are also disaggregated to their members. The attribution process continues to 
the fourth level, at which point all indirect payment beneficiaries must be individuals. If, at the fourth level, an 
entity has an interest in a third-level entity, then the first-level entity’s payment is reduced by the attributed owner-
ship share of the fourth-level entity. Payment limits apply to all individuals and entities regardless of the level 
at which they may appear, and directly attributed payments for a given program in a program year are summed 
across all payments to determine if reductions will be applied for each individual and entity. 
In general, payment limits are applied to individuals and entities, not to farm households. Furthermore, payment 
limits are not applied on a calendar-year or fiscal-year basis unless one or the other is the applicable program year 
for a given program (e.g., the fiscal year is the applicable program year for the Conservation Reserve Program). 
Hence, payments received in a calendar year may represent payments for 2 or more program years. Finally, direct 
attribution is applied and payment limit checks are done before each payment is made.38 
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Among farms receiving CCPs:
•	Approximately	1	percent	(roughly	1,500	farms)	received	CCPs	over	
$65,000; total CCPs to these farms accounted for about 29 percent of 
CCPs. 
•	Less	than	1	percent	(about	500	farms)	received	CCPs	over	$130,000;	
total CCPs to these farms accounted for approximately 16 percent of 
CCPs. 
These payments can legitimately exceed limits set by the 2008 Farm Act 
because the ARMS tracks payments to farm businesses and the payment 
limits apply to individuals and legal entities. Some of the payments could be 
going to junior partners in the farm business. Under the Act, payment limits 
for general partnerships are applied to each partner. As long as each partner 
is actively engaged in the farming operation, each partner has a separate 
payment limit. A person is considered actively engaged in farming if he or 
she makes a significant contribution of operating funds, equipment, land, 
labor, or active management to the farm. Moreover, recipients are allowed 
to receive an advance direct payment of 22 percent for the subsequent crop 
year. This means an individual could receive more than $40,000 in direct 
payments in a calendar year—up to $40,000 for the current crop year plus 
22 percent of the next crop year’s payment. Since the ARMS is based on a 
calendar year, such a situation would show up as more than $40,000 in the 
ARMS data.
Total counter-cyclical payments in 2009 were relatively low by historical 
standards—about $1.2 billion—because the payment rate is tied to commodity 
prices and commodity prices were high. In contrast, total CCPs in 2005, when 
commodity prices were low, were $4.5 billion in 2009 dollars (see figure 2). 
Payment limits for CCPs are more likely to bind when prices are low. Despite 
this fact, in 2005 farms receiving CCPs over $65,000 accounted for only about 
23 percent of total CCPs, and farms receiving CCPs over $130,000 accounted 
for only about 10 percent of total CCPs. The farms receiving these payments 
accounted for, respectively, 2 percent and less than 1 percent of farms 
receiving CCPs in 2005 (table 10). The number of CCPs that could potentially 
be affected by the payment limit in a given year varies considerably by farm 
type. In 2005, of the 1,099 crop farms with CCPs high enough to be potentially 
affected by the limit, an estimated 408 were cotton farms, accounting for about 
3 percent of all cotton farms (table 11). 
Table 11 
Crop farms with counter–cyclical payments over $130,000 in 2005,  
by farm type  
Farm type defined with value of production   
48-State total Item Cotton All other crops
Number of farms 408 691 1,099
Percent of farms 2.7 0.1 0.1
Source:  USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service and Economic Research Service, 2005 
Agricultural Resource Management Survey, all versions.39 
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The 2008 Farm Act removed payment limits on marketing loan benefits 
for crop years 2009-2012. However, an earlier proposal in the Senate26 
called for limiting marketing loan benefits (loan deficiency payments plus 
marketing loan gains) to $150,000 per individual. In 2009, about 15 percent 
of the sum of LDPs and marketing loan gains received by family farms went 
to family farms receiving more than $150,000 in marketing loan benefits. 
Farms receiving benefits above that level accounted for less than 1 percent 
of family farms receiving LDPs or marketing loan gains. Since commodity 
prices were high, total marketing loan benefits in 2009 were small—only 
$1.1 billion. In 2005, total marketing loan benefits were $7.7 billion in 2009 
dollars (see figure 2). However, even in that year of large marketing loan 
benefits, only 0.4 percent of family farms receiving payments had combined 
LDPs and marketing loan gains over $150,000, accounting for only 6 percent 
of those payments. The number of total LDPs and marketing loan gains over 
$150,000 also varies by farm type. In 2005, of the 1,278 crop farms that 
received LDPs or marketing loan gains over the proposed limit, 676 were 
corn farms and 125 were cotton farms (table 12). Although the number of 
corn and cotton farms receiving these large marketing loan benefits was high 
compared to other types of farms, only 0.7 and 0.8 percent of corn and cotton 
farms, respectively, received marketing loan benefits over $150,000 in 2005.
The Obama Administration’s fiscal year 2012 budget proposed limiting 
individual direct payments to $30,000. In 2009, about 5 percent of family 
farms receiving direct payments received payments over $30,000. Total 
direct payments to these farms accounted for 37 percent of direct payments 
to family farms. Since these payment limits would apply to individuals (and 
legal entities), under the proposed limit, a married couple could receive 
payments of up to $60,000. In 2009, about 2 percent of family farms 
with direct payments received direct payments over $60,000. Total direct 
payments to these farms accounted for about 18 percent of direct payments 
to family farms. The percentage of farms that might be affected by direct 
payment limits also varies by commodity (table 13). For example, in 2009, 
only about 1 percent of wheat, corn, and soybean farms had direct payments 
over $60,000, while 25 percent of rice farms and 9 percent of cotton farms 
had direct payments over $60,000. Of the estimated 7,569 farms receiving 
more than $60,000 in direct payments, 1,155 were rice farms and 767 were 
cotton farms. Payments over the proposed limit also accounted for a higher 
proportion of farm income for cotton and rice farms than other farms. For 
these rice and cotton farms, direct payments were, respectively, 9 percent and 
7 percent of GCFI, compared to only 4 percent of GCFI for the average of 
all other farms receiving more than $60,000 in direct payments. Large farms 
  26Senate Bill 385, from February 
2005.
Table 12 
Crop farms with marketing loan benefits over $150,000 in 2005,  
by farm  
Farm type defined with value of production   
48-State total Item Cotton Corn All other crops
Number of farms 125 676 478 1,278
Percent of farms 0.8 0.7 0.1 0.1
Source:  USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service and Economic Research Service, 2005 
Agricultural Resource Management Survey, all versions.40 
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are more likely to receive larger payments and have more than one operator 
receiving income from the farm business. Therefore, these estimates prob-
ably overstate the potential effects of the proposed direct payment limits on 
farm households. 
The effect of payment limits can be lessened in several ways. First, since 
each spouse can have a separate payment limit, married couples can share 
ownership so that the combined payment limit for the couple is effec-
tively doubled. Program payments to farm operators can also be affected 
by changing their land rental agreements. Landlords who receive direct 
payments as part of a share-rent agreement may be able to switch to cash-rent 
agreements and increase the rental rate to make up for the lost Government 
payments. Conversely, operators who currently cash-rent may be able to 
switch to share-renting, thereby sharing some of the payments with the land-
lord. Operators can also alter payments accruing to the farm by changing the 
legal organization of the farm business. One way to do this is by forming a 
general partnership.
For general partnerships, under certain situations, the sum of the partners’ 
individual payment limits increases when a partner is added. For example, 
when an adult family member is added to the partnership, that family 
member may be eligible to receive payments if he or she is actively engaged 
in the farming operation. The statutory definition of “actively engaged” 
includes any person that makes a significant contribution of active personal 
management. However, a 2004 GAO study found that USDA’s regulations 
to ensure recipients are actively engaged in farming do not provide a measur-
able standard for what constitutes a significant contribution of active personal 
management (GAO, 2004).
Effects of Payment Limits in Practice
While there are a number of options for legitimately increasing the amount 
of program payments a farm is eligible to receive, adopting these changes in 
business organization could affect the distribution of risk-sharing in the farm 
sector. Partners in a farm business and landlords in a share-rental agreement 
share some of the risk inherent in agricultural production. For example, if a 
landlord agrees to share-rent instead of cash-renting, then the landlord faces 
some risk that the share-rent will be lower than expected in the event of low 
yields or crop prices. Economic theory suggests that people do not volun-
tarily accept additional risk without being compensated for it. For example, 
Table 13 
Farms with direct payments over $60,000 in 2009, by farm type  
Farm type defined with value of production  
48-State total Item Wheat Corn Soybeans Rice Cotton Peanuts  Other
Number of farms 3,298 1,416 793 1,155 767 60 3,081 7,569
Percent of farms 0.9 1.0 1.0 25.1 9.4 3.7 0.2 0.3
Percent of GCFI 6.6 2.7 5.4 8.7 7.0 na 3.7 4.3
GCFI = Gross cash farm income. 
Source:  USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service and Economic Research Service, 2009 Agricultural Resource Management Survey, all 
versions41 
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landlords who accept additional risk by switching from cash-rent to share-
rent may ask for higher share-rents.
Payment limits might also affect land prices. Since land values are affected 
by the economic returns to the land—including Government payments—an 
increase in the number of farms affected by payment limits would tend to 
reduce the value of that land. Nationally, only a small percentage of farms 
received direct payments of more than $60,000, so it is unlikely that a $30,000 
direct payment limit would significantly affect national average land prices. 
However, roughly 25 percent of rice farms and 9 percent of cotton farms had 
direct payments over $60,000 in 2009. Therefore, other things equal, lower 
payment limits are more likely to exert downward pressure on land prices 
in States with many large cotton and rice farms, such as California and 
Arkansas.
Finally, reduced payment limits may not halt the shift of production toward 
larger farms. The current and proposed payment limits apply to legal entities 
and individuals, and larger farms are more likely to have multiple opera-
tors sharing income and payments from the farm business (see table 9). 
Payments’ share of GCFI already declines with farm size (see tables 1 and 2), 
and larger farms are still more profitable than smaller farms. Therefore, it is 
likely that production will continue to shift toward larger farms even if lower 
payment limits are implemented.
Payment limits can also affect production. Direct and counter-cyclical 
payments are not based on a farm’s current production. However, a farm’s 
LDPs and marketing loan gains are directly affected by the farm’s current 
production, and thus limits on these types of benefits might affect production 
even if they do not cause operators to alter the size of their operation. For 
example, suppose a marketing loan benefit limit was in effect, the limit was 
expected to bind for a cotton producer, and cotton production that year was 
not expected to be profitable without LDPs. In this case, the cotton producer 
might plant fewer acres. If many cotton producers expect to be affected by 
the payment limit, then total cotton production could decrease. 
It is difficult to determine precisely how low hypothetical payment limits 
on marketing loan benefits would have to be to significantly affect produc-
tion, because operators make production decisions in the face of uncertainty 
about yields, production costs, and market prices as well as payments tied 
to production. For example, when operators decide which crops to plant and 
how many acres of each crop, they do not know exactly what their yields will 
be (i.e., how many bushels or pounds per acre they will be able to harvest) 
or what commodity prices will be after harvest. If after-harvest commodity 
prices are unexpectedly low and a particular operation’s yields are unexpect-
edly high, then that operation’s marketing loan benefits could be higher than 
the operator expected them to be at planting time. 
Despite this uncertainty, it is possible to simulate the effects of payment 
limits under various yield, production cost, and market price scenarios. 
Using data on yields and prices from 2004, Goodwin (2009) performed a 
computer simulation of the effects of the payment limits proposed in Senate 
Bill 385 (introduced in February 2005) on acreages of program crops in 
key commodity-producing States. Goodwin assumed that operators are 42 
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risk-averse—that is, they are willing to forgo some potential profits in order 
to avoid some potential loss. The simulation results varied by State, crop, 
average yield, market price, and farm-operator risk aversion. Goodwin found 
that payment limits were most likely to affect production for California and 
Arkansas rice and cotton farmers who tend to have larger farms. Cotton and 
rice farmers also tend to receive higher payments per acre than for other 
commodities, making it more likely that payment limits will bind (Monke 
2005). For example, Goodwin found that marketing loan benefit limits 
would probably have the largest effect on the acreage of Arkansas cotton 
farms. In Arkansas, 65 percent of the cotton acreage is on farms for which 
hypothetical marketing loan benefit limits were likely to be binding when 
yields are high and prices are low. At planting time, if operators expect high 
cotton yields and low cotton prices, they may plant fewer acres of cotton. As 
a result, cotton production would decline. However, under most scenarios, 
the proposed payment limits on CCPs and LDPs were unlikely to have a 
significant effect on total acreages of soybeans, corn or wheat in key States 
producing those commodities. To the extent that production continues to 
shift to larger operations, potential limits on marketing loan benefits might 
become binding for a larger percentage of corn, wheat, and soybean farms, 
and thus have a larger effect on production of those commodities.43 
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Conclusions
U.S. agricultural production has been shifting toward larger farms because 
they are more profitable, and this trend is likely to continue. Operators 
of larger farms tend to earn higher incomes. Consequently, Government 
payments, as currently structured, will probably continue to shift to higher 
income households. As these trends continue, current payment limits and 
income eligibility caps may affect a larger share of payments.
The Federal Government supports farmers through a variety of USDA 
programs. These include conservation programs, commodity-related 
programs, disaster payments, federally subsidized crop insurance, and other 
programs. Recent proposals to reduce payments to farmers have focused on 
commodity-related programs—which include direct and counter-cyclical 
payments programs and marketing loan benefits—and federally subsidized 
crop insurance. Although most of these payments go to high-income house-
holds, farm income can fluctuate from year to year because of fluctuations 
in commodity prices or yields. Furthermore, some of these payments are 
captured by nonoperator landlords in the form of higher rents.
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Appendix: Government Payments Programs for 
Farmers and Federal Crop Insurance
USDA runs several different types of payment programs for farmers. Here 
we classify and briefly describe the payment programs as well as the Federal 
crop insurance program. 
Commodity Direct Payments
Direct payments are annual fixed payments to farmers using their farm’s 
historic reported acreage—also called “base” acreage—and program 
payment yields for program crops (wheat, corn, barley, grain sorghum, oats, 
upland cotton, rice, soybeans, other oilseeds, and peanuts).27 These include 
production flexibility contract (PFC) payments prior to the 2002 Farm Act. 
Note that soybeans, other oilseeds, and peanuts were not eligible for PFC 
payments. A farm’s base acreage for the PFC-eligible program crops was 
generally based on reported acreage during the 1991-1995 period and for 
other program crops during the 1998-2001 period. Program yields were 
generally established using yields during the 1981-1985 period. 
A farm’s owner can designate base acreage in one of several ways, and the 
rules for determining a farm’s base acreage have also changed over time.28 
Under the 2002 Farm Act, one of the simplest choices was to set the base 
acreage of a particular crop equal to average acreage planted to that crop 
from 1998 to 2001. Once the base acreage for a particular crop on a partic-
ular farm is determined, the farm’s direct payment for that crop is the product 
of a percentage of the base acreage (83.3 percent for crop years 2009-2011 
under the 2008 Farm Act), the farm’s “payment yield” for that commodity, 
and the statutorily mandated direct payment rate for that commodity. A 
farm’s payment yield for a commodity is also based on that farm’s historical 
yield for that commodity. For example, in 2009 the direct payment rate for 
corn was 28 cents per bushel. Therefore a farm with 100 base acres of corn 
and a corn payment yield of 110 bushels per acre would receive a direct 
payment for corn of 0.833 times 100 times 110 times 28 cents, or $2,556.29 
This payment is independent of the price of corn in 2009 or whether or not 
the farm planted any corn in 2009. However, production on a given farm 
tends to be correlated over time, so farms that currently produce large quanti-
ties of a program commodity also tended to produce large quantities of that 
commodity in the past, and thus have high levels of direct payments.
The fact that direct payments are not tied to current production puts them 
in a special category under World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements. 
Program payments that are considered trade-distorting are subject to limits 
under the WTO.30 However, direct payments are currently not considered 
to be trade-distorting. This means that, unlike most other major program 
payments, direct payments are not subject to WTO limits.
Counter-Cyclical Payments
Like direct payments, counter-cyclical payments (CCPs) are based on a farm’s 
base acreage for a particular crop, the counter-cyclical payment yield, and 
the legislatively mandated payment rate formula (in this case, the CCP rate). 
  27The phrase “direct payments” also 
sometimes refers to any Government 
payment made directly to farmers. In 
this report, we use the phrase “Govern-
ment payments” to refer to any Govern-
ment payment made directly to farmers. 
We use the phrase “direct payments” 
to refer to fixed payments to farmers 
based on their historic production. In 
our definitions, “Government pay-
ments” include direct payments. 
  28See Young et al. (2005) for a 
detailed description of the options for 
updating base acres and program yields 
in the 2002 Farm Act.
  29See USDA Farm Service Agency’s 
Fact Sheet on Direct and Counter- 
Cyclical Payments for additional 
examples at: http://www.fsa.usda.gov/
Internet/FSA_File/dcp2008.pdf/.
  30Note that the WTO limits are 
distinct from payment limits defined by 
Congress.47 
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Unlike direct payments, the counter-cyclical payment rate depends on market 
prices. The counter-cyclical payment rate for a commodity is the amount 
that its “effective price” falls below its target price. The effective price for a 
commodity is the direct payment rate plus the higher of (a) the national average 
market price received by producers during the marketing year or (b) the 
national loan rate for the commodity. The national loan rate for a commodity is 
the national average price USDA offers for a commodity under the marketing 
assistance loan programs. For example, suppose the 2009 national average 
market price for soybeans was $5.10 per bushel and the national loan rate was 
$5.00 per bushel. The direct payment rate for soybeans for that year was 44 
cents per bushel, and the target price was $5.80. In this case, the effective price 
for soybeans is $5.10 + $0.44 = $5.54 per bushel, and the counter-cyclical 
payment rate is $5.80 - $5.54 = $0.26 per bushel.
A farm’s counter-cyclical payment for a commodity is equal to the product of 
85 percent of the farm’s base acres for that commodity, the farm’s counter-
cyclical payment yield, and the given year’s counter-cyclical payment rate 
for that commodity. For example, suppose a farm has 100 base acres of 
soybeans and a counter-cyclical payment yield of 30 bushels per acre. Using 
the counter-cyclical payment rate of 26 cents per bushel, the farm’s counter-
cyclical payment for soybeans would be 0.85 times 100 base acres times 30 
bushels per acre times 26 cents per bushel, or $663. If the market price were 
lower, the CCP would be higher. Like direct payments, a farm’s CCPs do not 
depend on the farm’s current plantings. However, since a farm’s production 
tends to be correlated over time, farms that currently produce large quantities 
of program commodities also tend to have large counter-cyclical payments 
in years when CCPs are paid. When commodity prices are high, as they have 
been in recent years, farms do not receive counter-cyclical payments.
The Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) Program
The 2008 Farm Act authorized the Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) 
program, an alternative to the counter-cyclical payments program for crop 
years 2009 to 2012. To receive ACRE payments, the commodity for which a 
payment may be made must be grown on the ACRE-enrolled farm. Payments 
are triggered when State revenue and farm-level revenue for a commodity 
fall below benchmark levels. Thus, while CCPs mitigate price risk, the 
ACRE program mitigates revenue risk. A producer who enrolls a farm in 
the ACRE program may also receive direct payments, but such payments 
are reduced by 20 percent compared to what would otherwise be paid for 
the farm if it had been enrolled in the Direct and Counter-Cyclical Payment 
Program. About 8 percent of FSA-defined farms with about 14 percent 
of eligible base acres elected to participate in ACRE in 2010.31 ACRE 
payments for the 2009 crop, the first year of the program, were made in 
calendar year 2010, so the 2009 ARMS did not collect payment information 
on ACRE. Unlike direct and counter-cyclical payments, ACRE payments 
are made on the farm’s acreage planted to program commodities, but ACRE 
payment acreage is limited to the farm’s total base acreage.
  31See the 2010 ACRE Preliminary 
Enrollment Report, available at: http://
www.fsa.usda.gov/Internet/FSA_File/
prelim_2010_dcp_acr_enroll.xls/.48 
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Marketing Loan Benefits
USDA makes several forms of marketing loan benefits available to 
producers, including loan deficiency payments (LDP) and marketing loan 
gains. Marketing loans provide producers of certain commodities financing 
at the time of harvest so that they don’t have to sell when prices are low. The 
commodity itself is pledged to the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) 
as collateral for the loan. When the CCC’s proxy for the market price (the 
alternative loan repayment rate)  drops below the loan rate (which is set by 
statute), producers are allowed to repay the loan at the alternative loan repay-
ment rate. The difference between the alternative loan repayment rate and the 
loan rate is the marketing loan gain rate. Therefore, the more the loan rate 
exceeds the alternative loan repayment rate, the greater benefit the producer 
receives. Producers who are eligible for marketing loan gains can opt to 
take the gains directly as a payment. These are known as loan deficiency 
payments (LDPs). 
A third form of marketing assistance benefit involves the use of commodity 
certificates which the CCC was mandated to offer through the 2009 crop. 
Producers used to be able to take out a CCC marketing loan and at the same 
time or later purchase commodity certificates to settle the loan at the alterna-
tive loan repayment rate. If the alternative loan repayment rate was below the 
applicable marketing loan rate, the difference was the commodity certificate 
exchange gain (CEG). CEGs were not subject to the payment limit.
Unlike direct payments and counter-cyclical payments, marketing loan 
benefits directly depend on current production. Farms that produce large 
quantities of a program commodity may receive large marketing loan benefits 
(assuming the marketing loan rate is above the alternative loan repayment 
rate). For example, for 2008, the loan rate for upland cotton was 52 cents per 
pound. Suppose an Arkansas farm produced 100,000 pounds of upland cotton 
that year, and the alternative loan repayment rate was 48 cents per pound. 
In this case, if the producer elects to receive an LDP, the payment would be 
100,000 x $0.04, or $4,000. If the market price is above the loan rate, as it 
has been for most commodities in recent years, then farms do not receive any 
marketing loan benefits.
To summarize, direct payments and CCPs are based on a farm’s recent 
historical plantings or base acreage and historical program payment yields. 
For ACRE payments and marketing loan benefits, payments depend on 
current production. Because of the relationships between payments and 
production, shifts in production to larger farms will also shift the distribution 
of payments to larger farms.  
Conservation Payments
Conservation programs include land-retirement programs and working-land 
programs. Land-retirement programs require that the landowners not produce 
on the land enrolled in the program. The main land-retirement program is the 
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), which gives farm owners or opera-
tors an annual per-acre rental payment in exchange for taking highly erodible 
and environmentally sensitive cropland and marginal pasture out of produc-
tion for 10 to 15 years. The Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program 49 
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(CREP) supplements the CRP by providing additional economic incentives 
for farmers to retire land from production in areas that address specific State 
and nationally significant water quality, soil erosion, and wildlife habitat 
concerns. Landowners who participate in the Wetlands Reserve Program 
(WRP) can receive payments for implementing a wetlands restoration and 
protection plan. The goals of the WRP include providing habitat for wetland-
dependent wildlife, protection or improvement of water quality, and attenua-
tion of water flows to reduce flooding. 
In contrast to land-retirement programs, working-land programs provide incen-
tives for natural resource conservation on land still in production. Working-
land programs include the Conservation Security Program (CSP) and the 
Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP). The 2008 Farm Act 
replaced the CSP with the Conservation Stewardship Program (CStP). The 
CSP and the CStP pay farmers for maintaining or adopting structural or land 
management practices that address natural resource concerns such as air, water, 
and soil quality. EQIP provides technical assistance and also pays farmers 
for part of the costs of implementing a wide range of conservation practices. 
Unlike the CSP and CStP, EQIP includes incentives for livestock producers.
Although EQIP payments do not directly depend on production, larger opera-
tions tend to have higher total costs of implementing many conservation 
practices. For example, larger hog operations produce larger quantities of 
manure, and the total cost of implementing manure management practices 
is higher than for smaller operations, especially if additional land has to be 
rented for applying the manure or if the manure has to be removed from the 
farm. Therefore, EQIP payments for implementing manure management 
practices tend to be higher for large hog farms than for small hog farms. 
Disaster and Emergency Payments
Prior to the 2008 Farm Act, emergency or disaster relief payments were 
generally ad hoc Government responses to droughts, floods, or other natural 
disasters. For example, the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1999 provided 
$3.1 billion in “market loss” payments to grain, cotton, and dairy farmers in 
response to low prices for these commodities; $1.3 billion in farm disaster 
payments for 1998 crop losses; and $575 million in disaster payments for 
multi-year crop losses. Although emergency or disaster relief payments fluc-
tuate significantly from year to year, they have been a recurring feature of 
Government support for decades (Chite, 2010). Since larger farms tend to 
suffer larger losses when natural disasters occur, larger farms tend to receive 
higher levels of disaster payments.
The 2008 Farm Act introduced a standing emergency disaster program—the 
Supplemental Agricultural Disaster Assistance program—for losses that 
occur through September 30, 2011. This included the Supplemental Revenue 
Program (SURE) for crops, a livestock indemnity program, and a livestock 
forage disaster program, among others. To be eligible for the SURE program, 
farms are required to have a crop insurance or non-insured crop disaster assis-
tance program (NAP) policy.50 
Changing Farm Structure and the Distribution of Farm Payments and Federal Crop Insurance / EIB-91 
Economic Research Service/USDA
Other Government Payments
The Government also makes payments to farmers under programs that do 
not fit neatly into any of the above categories. For example, the Milk Income 
Loss Contract (MILC) program makes monthly payments to milk producers 
when a benchmark price for fluid milk falls below a certain level. MILC 
payments to a single operation are limited to a maximum of 2.985 million 
pounds of milk produced per fiscal year. The MILC program is designed 
to be counter-cyclical in prices, like CCP payments, but because MILC 
payments are capped at certain levels of production, they are directed to 
smaller and mid-size farms. Other programs are temporary. For example, 
the peanut quota buyout paid owners of peanut marketing quota in one 
lump-sum payment or in payments over several years from 2002 to 2006.32 
The Tobacco Transition Payment Program helps tobacco quota holders and 
producers transition to the free market with annual transitional payments 
which began in 2005 and continue through 2014. These payments are funded 
through assessments of approximately $10 billion on domestic tobacco 
product manufacturers and importers. 
Federal Crop Insurance 
In addition to Government payments, the USDA reduces risk for farmers 
by subsidizing crop insurance. USDA’s Risk Management Agency 
(RMA) provides insurance to farmers through the Federal Crop Insurance 
Corporation (FCIC), which the agency operates and manages. RMA is 
responsible for developing insurance products and works with 17 private-
sector insurance companies to sell and service the policies. 
Costs to the Federal Government from the crop insurance program include: 
Federal premium subsidies, administrative and operating (A&O) costs, and 
program underwriting losses (or gains). RMA establishes premium rates 
and shares risk with the private companies in an agreement known as the 
Standard Reinsurance Agreement (SRA) (USDA, RMA, 2010). A producer 
purchasing an insurance policy from a private company pays a portion of 
the premium, which increases as the level of coverage rises. RMA subsi-
dizes the rest of the premium, with the subsidy rate varying from 38 to 67 
percent. These premium subsidies totaled $4.7 billion in 2010. Under the 
current SRA, which was completed in 2010, RMA reimburses the insurance 
companies for A&O costs, up to a limit of $1.3 billion per year (adjusted for 
inflation). The SRA also determines how risk is shared between RMA and 
the insurance companies. Under the SRA, the RMA assumes the liability for 
some of the insurance policies, and the private insurance companies retain 
the liability for others. The Government’s underwriting loss (or gain if nega-
tive) is the difference between total indemnity payments and total premiums, 
plus or minus the private insurance companies’ gains or losses. In 2009, the 
RMA’s underwriting losses were $108 million, and in 2010, its gains were 
$2.5 billion (Shields, 2010).33 
Various insurance policies are available. Policies can insure against unex-
pectedly low yields for a particular crop, low revenue from a crop, low 
revenue for an entire farm, or unexpectedly low yields or revenues for an 
entire county. Policies are available for over 100 crops, although availability 
varies by county. There are also insurance policies available for livestock. 
  32Prior to 2002, domestic producers 
of peanuts for domestic “food use” had 
to own marketing quota in order to sell 
the peanuts.
  33See Shields (2010) for more infor-
mation on Federal crop insurance. 51 
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In recent years, Federal crop insurance has become increasingly important. 
In 2009, farms received a total of $5.1 billion of indemnity payments—
the payments to farmers for crop losses—from Federal crop insurance. 
Farmers can also purchase insurance that is not subsidized by the Federal 
Government. However, this insurance is limited to hail, wind, and fire. 
Broader insurance, known as multi-peril crop insurance (MPCI) is subsidized 
by the Federal Government. In this report, we focus on federally subsidized 
crop insurance.52 
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List of Acronyms
A&O: Administrative and Operating
AGI: Adjusted Gross Income
ACRE: Average Crop Revenue Election program
ARMS: Agricultural Resource Management Survey
ARPA: Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000
CCC: Commodity Credit Corporation—a Government-owned and -operated 
entity created to stabilize, support, and protect farm income and prices
CCP: Counter-Cyclical Payments
CEG: Commodity certificate Exchange Gain
CPI-U: Consumer Price Index for all Urban consumers
CPS: Current Population Survey
CRP: Conservation Reserve Program
CREP: Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program
CSP: Conservation Security Program
CStP: Conservation Stewardship Program
CV: Coefficient of Variation
DP: Direct Payments
EISA: Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007
EQIP: Environmental Quality Incentives Program
ERS: Economic Research Service
FCIC: Federal Crop Insurance Corporation
FCRS: Farm Costs and Returns Survey
FSA: Farm Service Agency
GAO: Government Accountability Office
GCFI: Gross Cash Farm Income
GDP: Gross Domestic Product
IRS: Internal Revenue Service
LDP: Loan Deficiency Payment
MILC: Milk Income Loss Contract program
NAP: Noninsured Crop Disaster Assistance Program
NASS: National Agricultural Statistics Service
PFC: Production Flexibility Contract
PPI: Producer Price Index
PPIFP: Producer Price Index for Farm Products
RMA: Risk Management Agency
ROE: Return on Equity
SURE: Supplemental Revenue Assistance Payments program
WRP: Wetlands Reserve Program
WTO: World Trade Organization